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Aegis: The Otterbein College Humanities Journal
Statement of Editorial Policy

A journal designed to catalyze a deeper critical appreciation of the humanities at Otterbein College, Aegis seeks scholarly essays and book reviews that advance the presence and values of the
humanities on campus and beyond.
In accord with the National Endowment for the Humanities’ (NEH) deﬁnition of the humanities, Aegis will consider scholarly essays and book reviews in the following disciplines:
history; philosophy; languages; linguistics; literature; archeology; jurisprudence; the history,
theory, and criticism of the arts; ethics; and comparative religion.
Essays and reviews of books in the social sciences that are historical or philosophical in
approach—or that involve questions of interpretation or criticism traditionally in the humanities—will also be eligible for publication in Aegis. Aegis will also consider essays and reviews
of books that use the disciplines of the humanities to interpret, analyze, or assess science and
technology.
Essays should be between 10-20 pages—in twelve point type, double-spaced, and in Times
New Roman font with standard one-inch margins. This includes pages devoted to notes and/or
works cited pages. Book reviews should be between 4-8 pages—in twelve point type, doublespaced, in Times New Roman font with standard one-inch margins.
Aegis is committed to nonsexist language and to wording free of hostile overtones.
Aegis will appear annually during the ﬁrst week of May of each calendar year. Essays and
book reviews will be received on a rolling basis. The deadline for the coming year’s edition
shall be the second Friday of Winter Quarter. Essays and book reviews received after this date
will be considered for the following year’s edition—even if the writer is in the ﬁnal year of
his/her study at Otterbein.
Submissions, prepared according either to the MLA Style Manual or The Chicago Manual of
Style, should be sent in duplicate and addressed to Paul Eisenstein, Faculty Advisor, Aegis, 227
Towers Hall, Otterbein College, Westerville, Ohio, 43081. If you are submitting through the
U.S. Mail and wish for one copy of your submission to be returned, please include a self-addressed envelope with sufﬁcient postage. Authors’ names should not appear on submitted
essays; instead, submissions should be accompanied by a cover sheet, on which appears the
author’s name, address, and the title of the essay. All essays accepted for publication will need
eventually to be submitted on hard diskette in Microsoft Word.
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Although Otterbein College enjoys a tradition of student publication, most notably
with its literary magazine, Quiz and Quill, it has until now lacked a forum for student work
in those disciplines that make up the humanities. Aegis aspires to be such a forum, providing
a venue for the exhibition of our work and the exchange of our ideas. We welcome you now
to the ﬁrst of these conversations, a conversation that we hope will bring greater attention to
alternative methods of inquiry to Otterbein and respond to the questions, “Why the humanities?” and, more speciﬁcally, “Why Aegis?”
In order to answer the former question, we must consider the values of the humanities and how they differ from those of the Sciences, including the political and social sciences
as well as the study of Business and Economics. These, the “epistemic disciplines,” praise the
use of objective reasoning based on concrete evidence to answer inquiries. Trying to ﬁnd an
equally concise deﬁnition of the humanities’ values proves more daunting, however. Merely
listing the disciplines found in conventional deﬁnitions of the humanities—History, Philosophy, Foreign Language, Linguistics, Literature, the history, criticism and theory of the Arts,
Ethics, and Comparative Religion—proves insufﬁcient. Instead, we must be more general and
transcend the limits of these disciplines in order to understand their common, foundational
values. In doing so, we realize that what these disciplines share is an emphasis on individual
voice and the promotion of a subjective synthesis with our world, rather than an objective
explanation of our world. The humanities thus allow each scholar to produce his or her own
method of approach, in contrast to the scientiﬁc subordination of the data-gatherer to the
system within which he or she works. With this in mind, it follows that every discipline has
such a qualitative, individualistic undercurrent, as every discipline is made up of individual
practitioners engaged in their crafts. Where the disciplines of the humanities and the sciences
part ways, however, is the level of priority they ultimately give the practitioner and his or her
experience.
For better or worse, our world subscribes to the latter treatment of a person’s
work—after all, scientiﬁc thinking and order produce more tangible, reportable results than do
the humanities. As an unfortunate consequence, the merit of subjective, individual ﬁndings is
often overlooked, science having no use for them unless “anchored in some kind of empirical
study or procedure of practical reasoning” (Altieri 250). Thus, we see the true injustice done
to the humanities in a scientiﬁcally-minded world: the qualitative inquiries of the humanities
are held up to the same expectations as the quantitative inquiries of the sciences and asked to
produce the same, objective results. This expectation, as we know, is unreasonable—like the
sciences, the humanities are an ongoing conversation, but the accent is placed on the conversation itself and not on its outcomes. The former strives for a linear progress, forever building on and moving beyond the results of preceding inquiries; the latter’s brand of progress,
however, is more of a network, constantly recalling past conversations and involving them in
new discourses.
The history and practices of psychoanalysis serve as a good example here: although
rejected by the medical community in favor of more expedient drug-therapies, psychoanalysis
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gradually provides patients with new dialogues and perspectives with which to examine their
lives, thereby approaching the roots of problems rather than merely suppressing the symptoms
for the sake of visible progress. While both therapies have the same ultimate objective—to
produce a recovered patient—psychoanalysis stresses the patient’s involvement in his own
recovery, valuing process over immediate result. Consequently, psychoanalytic practice is not
generally considered a viable therapy, a reﬂection of this society’s demands for quantiﬁable
outcomes and its opposition to the disciplines that comprise the humanities. Compared to the
sciences, they are often derided for lacking sources, system and method. These constructs,
of course, are less important to the scholar of the humanities than the quality of the thought
process itself.
Due to the abstract nature of such qualitative study, the need for continued research
in these areas appears less obvious to us than the need for research in the areas of their
empirical counterparts. In his essay, “What is Human About the Humanities,” Charles Altieri
remarks that, throughout history, those for whom the sciences’ merit is questionable or at
least less apparent have been touted as “unappreciated prophet[s] of some new world order”
(Altieri 253). Perhaps this attests to the personal nature of the joys afforded us by the humanities—after all, something is only “obvious” if it is backed by universal agreement. The very
structure and methods of the scientiﬁc disciplines imply this agreement, as they are designed
for a large number of practitioners in a broad community. In contrast, the many incarnations
of the humanities are the outcomes of individual expressions of passionate connection, and
so appeal to smaller, often specialized communities comprised of those who share a similar
enthusiasm. Also, the humanities do not require that these expressions be codiﬁed, so long as
they successfully communicate the experience. This liberates humanities scholars to create
works with an innovative, unpredictable quality, a quality unavailable to disciplines whose
practices aim to produce repeatable, foreseeable results. Nemour M. Landaiche champions
this quality in “Appealing to Passions for Commitment,” his response to Altieri’s essay, stating that the humanities “forgo those highly probable, socially engineered outcomes” sought
after by the sciences (Landaiche 266-67). In essence, the spirit of the humanities deﬁes the
institutionalization characteristic of the sciences, retaining a plasticity that fosters the celebration of the human experience. These disciplines act as a running commentary on “what
feels true about being alive,” an avowal of our encoded existence; rather than ask “Why the
humanities?” we should try to imagine the unengaging quality of a life without them (Landaiche 267). Indeed, wouldn’t the pleasure of viewing a movie be ruined if we were unable to
discuss our personal interpretations, gleaned from the execution of a script? What would be
lost if personal belief systems were denied the ability to examine religious constructs? Who
would wish to create art without an audience to appreciate and further its meaning? We cannot
escape the value of our experiences and interpretations, the tang and zest they add to what
could be an otherwise savorless life. Providing a means for commentary on our individual
experiences, the humanities unite and humanize us.
The concluding question of “Why Aegis?” remains, however. It is our conviction
that Aegis offers the chance to engage in life’s inquiries and to communicate our ﬁndings
concerning these inquiries. Although we are still in a nascent stage of identifying what truly
excites us, still experimenting with the formulation of and commitment to our inquiries, we
are nonetheless even now practitioners in our various ﬁelds. This journal aims to alert us to
this, to help us know the rightness of pursuing our passions. Also, Aegis hopes to model the

standards for honest and authentic communication shared in common by the disciplines of
both the sciences and the humanities (for, although their values are not the same, standards are
uniformly high). Aegis is our venue, a publication in which to support each other’s endeavors,
to share our discoveries, and, ultimately, to ﬁnd our own answers to the question, “Why the
humanities?”
Works Cited
Altieri, Charles. “What Is Human about the Humanities?” Soundings 84 (2001): 245-64.
Landaiche, Nemour M. “Appealing to Passions for Commitment: A Discussion of Charles
Altieri’s ‘What Is Human about the Humanities?’” Soundings 84 (2001): 265-80.
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Interview with Dr. Richard Leppert:
Importance of the Humanities
Ashar Foley and Teresa Moore

AEGIS: From your experience teaching the humanities, what do you feel is their importance
to current college-age students and to the college atmosphere itself?
LEPPERT: College may constitute the last time in your life when you can dedicate concentrated time to the broad topics associated with liberal education, unless [you] go on to some
other kind of professional training or graduate school. In terms of what the humanities offer
people at that time of life, it is largely a matter of trying to understand some things about
how the world works. It’s a way of coming to terms with the way that individuals come to be
[how] they are (for better or worse); the way that societies get constructed; the way that differences in race, class, gender, age, religious belief, and political belief get formed and play out
in society. The humanities are certainly not the only forms of inquiry that address these questions. After all, that goes on in the social sciences in particular as well. I think it boils down to
a way of learning about yourself and learning about the world you live in and, as we all know,
that kind of knowledge is crucial for being able to function. Higher education in general, and
especially in the humanities and social sciences, help us [to] responsible citizenship, or at
least it gives people the opportunity to understand issues of politics, ethics, morality, and so

7

LEPPERT: Well, there are a couple things. With regard to the ﬁrst part of the question, I think
the connections that I trace among art, music and literature relate to the way I study them as a
part of their shared cultural milieu. In other words, if I’m looking at something from Twentieth Century American culture, a work of literature, some music and an artwork, certainly
the most obvious thing each has in common with the others is their cultural frame, namely
Twentieth Century America. At the same time—and this gets back to the second part of your
question—while American art, literature and music share the same cultural frame, they are
of course separate practices that have something unique about each of them. The way that a
writer, a poet or a novelist, say, addresses a cultural question is not the same as how a visual
artist or a musician would. So, the speciﬁc differences between those discursive forms have to
be respected.

leppert

AEGIS: We understand that you study and teach multiple divisions of the humanities: music,
literature, and art. How do these divisions inform one another? Do you feel as though they
are different aspects of one identity or all to be approached in different manners?

aegis 2004

This year, Aegis had the opportunity to hold an interview with Otterbein College’s visiting
Humanities Scholar, Dr. Richard Leppert. We were interested to know about his views regarding the academic importance, non-academic inﬂuence, status, and ﬂexibility of the humanities.

on that are usually thought to be crucial to free societies and to societies that have some claim
to being decent.
AEGIS: Do you feel that ﬂows into the world outside of higher education?
LEPPERT: Yes, that’s what I mean. Another way of saying it is that it is one of the means by
which the next generation of adults is educated for life, educated in order to live both a richer
and a better life - a fuller life - and not just for themselves.
AEGIS: Would you say that the same sort of contact with the humanities is available to people
who aren’t put into the college experience?
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LEPPERT: I think it is certainly true that people can gain access to the humanities by means
other than formal education. To use a parallel example, learning a foreign language: there are
various ways to do it. One, of course, is through language study within a college where you
have formal training. Another is to be put in such a situation where that’s where you hear the
language.
AEGIS: What do you think is the present state of the humanities, and would you agree that
there is a somewhat declining interest in its study and research?
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LEPPERT: I think that’s a complicated question. Part of the difﬁculty is that what people
mean to include within the terrain of the humanities has changed a lot in the last thirty years.
Let me give a concrete example in music: when I was of college age, there was literally no
possibility within a college or university setting to talk about popular music. It was not considered worthy of being discussed within the humanities. Obviously, today that has changed.
Probably most music departments teach various forms of popular music, whether rock of
various types, or jazz, etc. But certainly when popular musical genres were ﬁrst entering the
academy, there were huge debates about that (which today are still not entirely settled); the
more conservative side basically saw this as the barbarians at the door and thought the humanities were being destroyed because of the encroachment of popular culture. That is not my
view, but it is one that held a good deal of sway and at least holds some sway today. In a more
direct answer to your question, and again sticking to music, I think quite arguably precisely
the opposite is true, that there is a great deal more interest in the humanities today than there
has been in a very long while if you understand by the humanities more than already-sanctioned canonic cultural practices. If you think about the number of kids today, beginning in
junior high and on up through high school and into college, who make music, the numbers are
staggering. On the other hand, if you mean how many kids today are interested in nineteenthcentury opera or symphonic music, those numbers are declining, though how greatly they are
declining by comparison with the history of my generation may not be all that great
AEGIS: Would your deﬁnition then include popular culture, and how would you use popular
culture in academic study and inquiry?
LEPPERT: Insofar as I’m concerned, it very much does include popular culture. [Currently]

I teach an upper division course principally taken by juniors and seniors called “Music as
Discourse.” I make absolutely no distinction between various forms of classical music and
popular music; in fact, I rarely use the term. I simply come in, and I talk about music. So,
during a single class period, we may talk about a piece of avant-garde, early Twentieth Century classical music; a piece of 1960’s jazz; a piece of folk music; and maybe some punk, or
reggae, etc. We discuss lots of issues including one surrounding aesthetic quality. But I make
it very clear that the issue of good music and bad is not deﬁned by whether it’s classical as
opposed to popular. I think that kind of essentialist posturing is intellectually irresponsible and
dishonest.

Dr. Richard Leppert is Distinguished Professor in the Department of Cultural Studies and
Comparative Literature at the University of Minnesota. As annual visiting Humanities Scholar, he presented his lecture, “Paradise, Nature, and Reconciliation, or A Tentative Conversation with Wagner, Puccini, Adorno, and the Ronettes.”
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LEPPERT: The distinction is one which everybody understands: there’s a certain group of
music called classical and there’s a certain body of music called popular. I acknowledge the
fact that we have these categories; what I don’t acknowledge is that the music in one category
is necessarily good and the other is necessarily bad. What I felt was sort of interesting with
students of recent years, at least with those that take this class, [is that] a couple weeks into
the term, I pass out a survey form and there are two questions on it. The ﬁrst question is,
“What kind of music do you like to listen to, or, if you are a musician, to play?” The second
question is, “What kind of music do you NOT listen to currently but which you would like to
know more about?” As you’d expect, most students are most connected to various forms of
popular music, and often in highly speciﬁc categories of popular music. What has surprised
me in the last few years in terms of the second question - “What do you not know much about
but would like to know more about?” - a number of students mention various types of classical music and a lot of them mention opera. The only thing I’ve wondered about that is whether [it is due to] the popularity of music videos, because there’s a bit of similarity between
music videos and opera. Whether that makes people more curious about it, I don’t know. But
I had been surprised at the number of students who are interested in classical music or would
like to know more. But I should add one other thing: the students in this class are not music
majors. The students who take the class from me are not building up professional careers in
formal music training, whereas in a music school or in a music department you’d expect many
more students to say they were interested in classical music, but I wouldn’t have expected that
in the general student population.

aegis 2004

AEGIS: Does your approach to art music and popular music help students also see them as
without a distinction?

Stirring the Great and Noble Horse of
Athenian Democracy: The Elenchus as
a Preserver of Athenian Law
Jason Carney

I. Establishing the Autocrat of Democracy
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In order to diagnose Socrates as either anti-democratic or pro-democratic, we must
ﬁrst localize the most basic attributes of a democratic government and a non-democratic
government. To begin deﬁning these basic attributes, let us consider two possible parties in
every governmental relationship and a consequently created entity, which we’ll denote as the
law. In any governmental relationship there seems to be a governed body and a governing
body. It could be the case, as in direct democracy, that the governing body and the governed
body occupy the same role at the same time. It could also be the case, as in autocracy, that the
governed body and the governing body occupy completely different roles.
One might be attracted to characterize the difference between democracy and autocracy on the basis of the presence or absence of a governing body separated from the governed
body. To illustrate: in a given autocratic government there is a king, empress, oligarchic
council, etc., who binds the people by his, her, or its commands. In autocracy, the governing
body becomes the law as such. Compare this to theoretical democracy, wherein the governed
people, through egalitarian collaborations, draft the very government to which they will
ultimately subjugate themselves. In democracy, the law is an extension of the will of those
who will be bound by it. Yet, in considering this distinction it does not seem correct to refrain
from considering democracy an autocratic government. Even in democracy the individual
is ultimately subjugated to the law of the will of the people as a whole, a law which seems
autonomous.
It seems that individual freedom is the primary good sought in democratic governments. Individual freedom is theoretically preserved in democracy by dispersing the reins
of a subjugating law to the subjugates. If we consider the primary goal of a government to
be the establishment of the best possible environment in which individuals have the highest
potential for attaining happiness, then the presupposition inherent in the democratic ideological scene is that individuals know what is best for themselves. The reverence for personal
freedom in democracy assures that individuals have this fundamental necessity for happiness.
The paradox seems to be that, although democracies are established presupposing a requirement for individual autonomy (variously justiﬁed: for example, Paine’s natural rights of man,
or Rousseau’s social contract theory), they must ultimately subjugate the individual to the
law established by their collective decisions, that is, the general will.¹ Therefore, it seems
incorrect to say that in a democracy the people are autonomous; it is rather the people’s law
that is autonomous. What I would like to emphasize is that, even in a democracy, the relative
power of an individual to inﬂuence the people’s law grows weaker as the governed population
increases. Even in democracy, there is an autocrat running the show.

[A]. The older accusations of Socrates; that is, the rumors of the masses. As characterized by Socrates in The Apology, age-old rumors charge him with “busying
himself studying things in the sky and below the earth; he makes the worse into the
stronger argument, and he teaches the same to others.” Socrates continues, “You
have seen this yourself in the comedy of Aristophanes, a Socrates swinging about
there, saying he is walking on air and talking a lot of other nonsense about things
which I know nothing at all” (Apology 19b-c).
[B]. The second, more recent accusations brought forth by Meletus for “corrupting
the young and of not believing in the gods in whom the city believes in, but in other
new spiritual things” (Apology 24c).
[C]. Socrates’ defense of himself against the two previous quantities of accusations.
Let us consider all three quantities of knowledge as a single entity, [ABC], which contains
within it the possibility of illustrating the correct decision to a governing body – in our instance, to the demos that made up the speciﬁc assembly present at Socrates’ trial. Let us conceive of [ABC], presented to the assembly, as a kind of Rubix cube which contains a potential
quantity of justice. The assembly was charged with confronting and deciphering this Rubix
cube. Ultimately, they failed. But why?
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The fundamental attribute of Athenian democracy was participation. A population of
approximately sixty-thousand to eighty-thousand slaves served forty-thousand to forty-ﬁvethousand adult male citizens in order to construct an environment in which Athenians could
have adequate time and energy to devote to public affairs. The demos, a Greek concept referring to the “common people” (complete with pejorative undertones), was theoretically the
sovereign governing body of the city. Ofﬁcial written decrees passed by the Athenian assembly employed the language, “by the demos,” instead of “by the ecclesia,” or, by the assembly.²
This implies that Athens was greatly interested in propping up the symbolic representations of
the law as the product of the people’s, the demos’, egalitarian collaborations. In other words,
Athens apparently needed constant reminders that autonomy was not in the hands of an autocrat; rather, it was in the hands of the men who tread up the Pnyx on frostbitten mornings.
Looking awry at any democracy, we can attempt to identify its autocratic kernel, and,
in the case of the ancient Athenian democracy, this kernel is the decree of the demos: not of
the individual constituents of the demos – the farmers, the wine-sellers, and the drunks—but
of the established decrees of the demos as such, removed and existing independently. It seems
correct to attribute the execution of Socrates to this entity. Accordingly, it seems incorrect to
attribute the execution of Socrates to the individual jurymen who voted for his death by hemlock. These votes established the agency which ultimately carried out the execution, but the
votes themselves did not tip the chalice.
If we consider the execution of Socrates as an objective injustice, we can attempt to
localize the error necessarily present in the course of events that entailed his trial. It seems the
demos that constituted the assembly to whom Socrates appeals in The Apology brought into
consideration three quantities of knowledge:

aegis 2004

II. The Task of Athenian Democracy

III. Plurality as a Harbinger of Irrationality
Consider Socrates’ characterization of his ﬁrst accusers who posit [A]:
Those who maliciously and slanderously persuaded you – who also, when persuaded
themselves then persuaded others – all those are most difﬁcult to deal with: one cannot bring one of them into court or refute him; one must simply ﬁght with shadows,
as it were, in making one’s defense, and cross-examine when no one answers. (Apology 18d)
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Socrates believes [A] will be the most difﬁcult to deal with. It seems the characteristic that
makes [A] so difﬁcult is the medium in which it travels – that is, from the mouths of many
people rather than from the mouth of one. In a manner of speaking, one could correlate the
rumors of ill-repute regarding Socrates, established by a collaborative agency on the part of
the numerous Athenians who “when persuaded then persuaded others,” to the law established
through the egalitarian collaborations fundamental to democracy. What I mean to emphasize
is that it seems Socrates is turned into an atheist, a metaphysical scientist, and a sophist, in
some way along the same method that the general will is turned into a subjugating agency
in democracy. Socrates understands that the opinion of the many is a terrible foe to come up
against: “You know what I said earlier is true, that I am very unpopular with many people.
This will be my undoing, if I am undone, not Meletus or Anytus but the slanders and envy of
many people. This has destroyed many other good men and will, I think, continue to do so”
(Apology 28b). Socrates understands [A] carries great power. The attribute of [A] that makes
it the most threatening for Socrates we shall denote as its plurality, and by plurality I mean
that [A] is established by numerous people in a sort of shared way rather than in an individual
way.
Therefore it seems [B] differs from [A] in that it lacks plurality. Socrates believes [B]
to some extent to be not nearly so threatening, which is illustrated by his bold claim that he
has sufﬁciently cleared himself of those accusations: “I think myself that I have been cleared
on Meletus’ charges, and not only this, but it is clear that, if Anytus and Lycon had not joined
him in accusing me, he would have been ﬁned a thousand drachmas for not receiving a ﬁfth of
the vote” (Apology 36b). It follows that Socrates’ defense, [C], lacks the attribute of plurality
as he is only one man setting forth the arguments. From the beginning, it seems Socrates is
handicapped, for his defense lacks plurality and it must contend against [A], which possesses
plurality, and [B], which does not possess plurality.
It is the plural nature of [A], supported by Socrates’ obvious acknowledgement of its
difﬁculty, that has a very direct inﬂuence upon his death. Once more I am positing that it is
not the numerous propagators of the rumors entailing [A] that cause Socrates’ execution. That
is, those who suffered from the elenchus – the politicians, the poets, and the craftsmen—do
not tip Socrates’ chalice. It is in fact the agency their general will established, namely [A] as
such. In the above conception of democracy, I’ve attempted to show that, although numerous individuals come together and collaborate to establish the general will, they effectively
relinquish their autonomy. The fallacy of continuing to consider the individual as autonomous
merely because he/she had some role in establishing the foundational autocrat of his/her government can be applied to the establishment of [A]. In other words, numerous rumormongers

of Athens came together and created the completely autonomous monster [A], which ultimately brings the axe to the block for Socrates.

But Socrates cannot be criticizing the individuals who make up the assembly; rather, he criticizes the agency established by their general will – the irrational autocrat that is the people’s
law.
It seems in the above quotations that Socrates and Finley posit two faults of the
assembly: (1) The assembly as such is unﬁt to seek out justice in [ABC]; (2) Opposing the
assembly alone almost always results in failure or even death, insofar asif you are truly seeking justice you must avoid the assembly. Upon what are these two faults founded? They are
founded upon the attribute of plurality that is present in the assembly, as the subtraction of
plurality from the assembly takes away both faults. Let us localize these two faults and consider their possibility without the presence of plurality in the assembly:

1. The assembly seems unﬁt to seek out justice because it is made up of amateurs
who are further curtailed by demagogues, who then pander to their whims at the
expense of the higher matters of state.
2. To oppose the assembly while it possesses plurality inevitably results in failure
or death.
To what do these faults amount? Plurality in the Athenian assembly seems to bring a quantity
of irrationality to the autonomous agency it establishes. Considering [A], Socrates implies that
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Be sure, men of Athens, that if I had long ago attempted to take part in politics, I
should have died long ago, and beneﬁted neither you nor myself. Do not be angry
with me for speaking the truth; no man will survive who genuinely opposes you or
any other crowd and prevents the occurrence of many unjust and illegal happenings
in the city. A man who really ﬁghts for justice must lead a private, not a public life, if
he is to survive for even a short time” (Apology 31e).

carney

But what does this mean for Socrates’ stance on democracy? What can we ascertain
by comparing the autonomous [A] to the autonomous law of the people established in democracy? At least Socrates is conﬁdent that he can contend with arguments which lack plurality,
yet he repeatedly reafﬁrms the more difﬁcult nature of dealing with an argument possessing
plurality. Let us consider the assembly charged with ﬁnding justice in [ABC].³ Such an assembly met in the open air on a hill called the Pnyx, near the Athenian acropolis, where thousands
gathered. In M.I. Finley’s book, The Ancient Greeks, he states, “In a sense, amateurism was
implicit in the Athenian ‘deﬁnition’ of a direct democracy. Every citizen was held qualiﬁed to
share in government by the mere fact of his citizenship, and his chances to play a part were
much intensiﬁed [¼] by the wide use of the lot” (79). Not only was this assembly made up of
citizens generally unfamiliar with the art of legislation, law, civic theory, etc., Finley reports it
was curtailed by emerging demagogues who, by “pandering to the demos in the Assembly and
the courts [did so] at the expense of the higher interests of state” (Finley 79). Socrates seems
to criticize the functionality of the assembly as such in the Apology:
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reasoning with plurality is like “ﬁght[ing] with shadows, as it were, in making one’s defense,
and cross-examin[ing] when no one answers” (Apology 18d). In a perfect world, the subtraction of plurality would also mean the subtraction of irrationality, but this is not always the
case, considering leaders like Adolph Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Emperor Palpatine. Socrates
believes that the subtraction of plurality inherently takes away a large quantity of power from
irrationality (for example, compare [A] to [B]), making it easier to refute, and that in some
sense the subtraction of plurality is also the subtraction of irrationality only insofar as it paves
the way for the institution of rationality. This sense is taken from Socrates’ apparent lack
of faith in the demos as a uniﬁed entity, expressed in such criticisms as “a man who really
ﬁghts for justice must lead a private, not a public life, if he is to survive for even a short time”
(Apology 31e).
But, if Socrates had his way, would he truly subtract plurality from the Athenian government? Would Socrates opt for the establishment of a proper autocracy (my use of the term
proper autocracy allows for the consideration of a democracy as an autocracy, considering
within it the people’s law is ultimately autonomous)? I think it would be too quick to say yes.
To some extent, Socrates cannot be against the reverence of individual freedom associated with democracy, because he enjoys it and needs it every time he applies the elenchus to
anyone (especially the situations in which he applies it to politicians). What I believe Socrates
truly opposes is the irrationality associated with the plural nature of the Athenian democracy.
If Socrates could, he would subtract the irrationality from plurality, and, in a manner, it was
his mission to do just that. Socrates would see the assembly keep its plurality, for this would
assure that the law to which he is subjugated affords the individual freedom necessary for
philosophy, art, and the search for happiness through one’s own means; but he would also see
the assembly lose the irrationality associated with plurality. To put it brieﬂy, I believe Socrates
desires an assembly with plurality that could decipher the Rubix cube of [ABC]. The question
is whether irrationality is separable from plurality. In other words, could the Athenian assembly ever possess plurality while at the same time lacking the irrationality associated with it?
I imagine Socrates standing near a pomegranate cart in the center of a mass of togawearing people, frantically pulling carpenters, priests, and potters aside as they tread towards
the Pynx for a meeting of the assembly. He has already found out through his experience with
the thirty tyrants that the Pynx is no place for him, and yet it seems that a sense of loyalty to
Athens compels him to snake his inﬂuence into the throng. The clarifying question is, does
Socrates believe the autocrat of Athenian democracy to be so ﬂawed as to justify its replacement by a non-plural autocrat, or, as Plato would say, by a philosopher king? The answer is
no. Socrates understands that the ﬂaw of the Athenian autocrat is its irrationality. While valuing the personal freedom democracy affords him, he attempts to cure the masses, to remove
the irrationality from the senate by seeing it composed of men with human wisdom:
I was attached to this city by the god – though it seems a ridiculous thing to say
– upon a great and noble horse which was somewhat sluggish because of its size and
needed to be stirred up by a kind of gadﬂy. It is to fulﬁll some such function that I
believe the god has placed me in the city. (Apology 30e)
To label Socrates as anti-democratic would imply that he has no faith in his fellow
Athenians coming together and establishing through their general will a rational autonomous
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Notes
1. “The general will” is a term coined by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, which describes decisions
made by the citizens of a republic, before which they set aside their private or partisan aims to
seek out a general good.
2. “Every male citizen who had reached his eighteenth birthday was eligible to attend [the
assembly] whenever he chose, barring a few who lost their civic rights for one offence or another. The assembly, in a word, was a mass-meeting and to address it required, in the strictest
sense, the power of oratory” (Finley 77-78).
3. In this situation it seems only technical to point out that it is not actually the individuals
who make up the assembly that are charged with ﬁnding justice in [ABC]; rather it is the assembly itself, an entity necessarily separate from the individuals whose general will, and, in
this instance, whose labors constitute it.
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agency, a people’s law that to confront is not like “ﬁghting with shadows.” Socrates’ elenchus
is not an attempt to show that the masses will always make the wrong choices. It is not an
attempt to show the Athenians the ultimate ﬂaws of their government. By demanding wisdom and virtue from the men who create Athens’ autocrat, Socrates’ elenchus is an attempt to
preserve their democracy.

Le héros nietzschéen dans Le
Ashar Foley
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En relisant l’introduction de R.J. Berg sur Le Cid dans Littérature Française: Textes
et Contextes, il était étonnant qu’une comparaison soit faite entre les héros cornéliens et le
héros idéal du philosophe Friedrich Nietzsche. En citant Nietzsche, Berg écrit: “Qu’est-ce
qui fait...l’histoire de chaque jour? Considère les habitudes qui la composent. Sont-elles le
produit d’une foule de petites lâchetés, d’une foule de petites paresses—ou celui de ton courage et de ton ingénieuse raison?” (Berg 254). Mais à mon avis, et m’appuyant sur mes études
récentes de la pensée du célébre philosophe allemand, je trouve que le héros cornélien n’est
pas du tout maître de son propre destin à cause de cette “ingénieuse raison.” Au contraire,
leur raison les plonge dans les lâchetés et les paresses car ils sont paralysés par leur adhésion
absolue à un code d’honneur. Sans doute, Chimène, Don Rodrigue, et Don Diègue sont-ils
héroïques dans le sens conventionnel et chevaleresque car ils restent toujours dans l’éthique,
mais ils sont loin de l’übermensch de Nietzsche, l’homme selon lequel nous devons modeler
nos vies.
L’auteur du Cid, Pierre Corneille, était peut-être plus proche de l’übermensch que
ses personnages. Bien que sa pièce eût été très populaire à ses débuts—Berg mentionne que
c’était à la mode de savoir quelques scènes par coeur (Berg 255)—l’Académie Française l’a
attaquée parce qu’elle ne suivait pas les règles du théâtre. Corneille a rejeté la convention de
la vraisemblance, où les personnages se trouvent dans les situations quotidiennes, en préfèrant
décrire des situations élevées dans lesquelles ses personnages doivent prouver leur grandeur
d’esprit. Corneille a déﬁé l’Académie en s’afﬁrmant comme auteur dramatique avec ses
propres règles. Par conséquent, ses pièces sont parmi les plus lues et les mieux connues des
pièces françaises.
Cependant, comme j’ai déclaré dans ma thèse, pour la plupart les héros de cette pièce
ne s’approchent pas de la grandeur de l’auteur dans ses efforts pour transcender la convention. Dans toute l’oeuvre, il y a seulement un personnage que l’on peut considérer vraiment
nietzschéen: le comte. Pour prouver ma thèse, voici mon premier argument:
Le comte, le père de Chimène, est en colère quand il apprend que Don Diègue, un
gentilhomme de plus basse extraction que lui, a reçu le titre de gouverneur de Castille. C’est
un vrai affront à l’honneur et à l’orgueil du compte, et il veut afﬁrmer son pouvoir et son
inﬂuence dans le royaume; il déclare que son nom “sert de rempart à toute la Castille” (Corneille 260)1. Toute chose que Don Diègue entreprenne se fait dans l’ombre de la protection
du Comte. Bien sûr, il faut que Don Diègue se défende, et les insultes s’intensiﬁent jusqu’au
“coup mortel,” le soufﬂet que le Comte donne audacieusement à Don Diègue (Corneille
262). Cette action casse le code d’honneur, elle marque la manque de respect envers le roi et
son cadeau du titre au Don. C’est vraiment incroyable—si tous les hommes se défendaient
d’une manière semblable, il n’y aurait aucun ordre. Mais le Comte déﬁe le code; il se pense
au-dessus des lois qui gouvernent les masses car il se considère comme un homme d’une plus
noble espèce. De plus, le roi n’est pas indemne d’injures: le Comte déclare plus tard au noble
Don Arias qu’il n’a pas peur d’un roi qui règne avec “un sceptre qui sans moi tomberait de sa
main!” (Corneille 265).
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En osant se présenter comme un individu au-dessus du groupe et au-dessus de
l’éthique, il entre dans ”La Grand Santé” de Nietzsche, la condition la plus enviable dans
laquelle un homme ne fait pas référence aux autres systèmes ou règles en constituant sa
propre manière de vivre. Un homme avec cette condition est authentique, il est son propre
individu. Dans son oeuvre, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Nietzsche décrit cet état, disant que
“the more one allows the individual and the incomparable to raise its head again” le plus serat-on dans la grande santé (Nietzsche 140). Cet individu fait ses propres règles sans scrupule et
ignore le code imposé sur lui par le monde, et donc il vit une vie supérieure car c’est une vie
sans souci envers la question morale. C’est vrai que le système du Comte implique l’honneur,
mais ce n’est pas le même honneur qui régit les autres personnages. Leur idée de l’honneur
les situe absolument sous le roi, alors que l’honneur du comte surpasse la hiérarchie. Donc
ce n’est pas encore nécessaire qu’il “brood over the moral value of [his] actions’” (Nietzsche
147). On pense au Comte aussi dans cette declaration de Nietzsche: “It will be the strong,
domineering natures who, in such a compulsion, in such a constraint and completion under
their own laws, will savor their most reﬁned joy” (Nietzsche 144). En ignorant la loi du roi et
du royaume, la loi du code social, le Comte montre la grandeur de son âme aussi bien que son
intrépidité face à l’adversité.
Bien que cet orgueil soit curieux et choquant pour les gens soumis au comte, Don
Sanche offre une sorte d’acceptation nietzschéene de son caractère quand il suggère au roi
qu’une “âme accoutumée aux grandes actions/ ne se peut abaisser à des submissions” (Corneille 268). Néanmoins, ni la société ni le roi n’acceptent cette explication. Le code requiert
que l’offenseur admette son erreur et qu’il ait honte. Mais le Comte refuse, et par conséquent
il est tué.
Il est clair que Le Cid est vraiment une pièce éthique, où les personnages, sauf le
Comte, luttent pour rester dans l’éthique. Dans ce monde social, il n’y a pas de place pour un
vrai héros nietzschéen: selon l’univers cornélien, puisqu’il a réfusé l’éthique, le comte ne peut
plus servir l’état et il ne fait plus partie du monde social. Comme on verra partout dans cette
analyse, il y a seulement deux choix dans le monde de l’éthique—la participation ou la mort,
ﬁgurée ou littérale. Le comte a réçu une mort littérale, mais qu’en est-il des autres pour qui
l’honneur social est si important?
Pour le héros cornélien, rester dans l’éthique est la seule façon de vivre. Demeurer
en dehors de l’éthique est une mort ﬁgurée, mais plus grave. On voit cette croyance en Don
Diègue, qui ne peut pas comprendre une existence en dehors du système. Son honneur est mis
en question quand le Comte afﬁrme que Don Diègue n’aurait pas reçu le titre de gouverneur
sans l’aide et la gloire du Comte. Pour le héros cornélien dans cette situation, ne pas restaurer
sa dignité, ne pas prendre l’action, est l’équivalent de “mourir sans vengeance, ou vivre dans
la honte” (Corneille 261). En conséquence, les seules options que Don Diègue présente à son
ﬁls sont “meurs ou tue” (Corneille 262).
Mais pourquoi ne transgresse-t-il pas l’éthique? Pourquoi ne peut-on pas le considérer héroïque comme le Comte? Sans aucun doute, il désobeit les lois en demandant à son
ﬁls de tuer le Comte. Mais il ne les transgresse pas parce que sa croyance en l’obligation de
restaurer l’honneur est partagée par toute la communauté. L’honneur est la trame de l’état,
la chose grâce à laquelle le roi pèse la valeur de ses sujets, surtout ceux qui aident à gouverner. Quand Don Diègue parle de la honte qu’il aura s’il “perd[ait] de la force,” il parle de
la réaction négative de la société qu’il sert. Sa réponse sanglante aux insultes du Comte fait

aegis 2004
18
foley

référence au monde social; elle est en accord avec les attentes du code. C’est vraiment un
paradoxe: pour rester dans l’éthique, il faut que Don Diègue viole la loi de ce système. Il serait ignoble s’il prennait un cours d’action moins drastique. Cependant, il faut qu’il aille plus
loin. Le code requiert qu’il se soumette à la punition, quelque chose que le Comte a refusé de
faire. Le Don offre sa tête au roi. En le faisant, il vit encore.
Mais il a un autre problème—il doit présenter l’action de son ﬁls comme quelque
chose d’héroïque. Comment le fait-il? Il explique son action sous un angle méritoire: Don
Rodrigue a obéit à son père et il a restauré le nom de sa famille. Son père décrit un ﬁls qui
est “digne de moi,/ Digne de son pays et digne de son roi” (Corneille 272). Ainsi, il offre
son ﬁls comme outil du roi et de la communauté. La manière de cette présentation reﬂète
l’observation de Nietzsche que “whatever proﬁts [the community] in the ﬁrst place [...] is also
the supreme measure of the value of all individuals [...] individuals are led to be functions of
the herd2 and to attribute value to them merely as functions” (Nietzsche 138). Il est clair que
Don Rodrigue a les qualités d’un citoyen idéal, qu’il a le potential d’être loyal à l’état. Le roi
verra la valeur de ce jeune homme et il verra le service qu’il rendrait; donc, il le pardonne.
Don Rodrigue est justiﬁé selon le roi, mais il a une double loyauté éthique et un
problème plus compliqué. En plus d’être un gentilhomme concerné par l’état, il est l’amant
de Chimène. Mais, comme Don Diègue, il faut qu’il reprenne son honneur après avoir violé
une loi, et aussi il faut qu’il s’amende. Avec l’aide de son père, il fait ses excuses au roi, mais,
parce que l’homme qu’il a tué était le père de son amante, il doit aussi en faire à Chimène.
Mais elle ne les accepte pas.
Avant qu’il venge son père, Don Rodrigue prévoit sa colère et la possibilité de perdre
son amante; il pèse les répercussions de la vengeance et son devoir envers les deux en disant,
“Je dois à ma maîtresse aussi bien qu’à mon père” (Corneille 264). Il conclut, cependant, que
son devoir immédiat revient à son père, à son sang, et à la position de sa famille dans la société. Il est le seul concerné par cet amour, et donc cet intérêt ne peut rivaliser avec l’éthique.
De plus, on voit que dans cet univers cornélien, une incapacité d’agir reviendrait à perdre
l’honneur et la place dans l’echelle sociale. Il arrive à considérer son amour comme un intérêt
inférieur à son devoir familial et social: “Contre mon propre honneur mon amour s’intéresse
/ Il faut venger un père, et perdre une maîtresse” (Corneille 263). Même après le meurtre du
Comte, Don Rodrigue afﬁrme à Chimène qu’il le ferait encore. Aussi, il réalise que, selon le
code, “un homme sans honneur ne [...] méritait pas” l’amour de sa dame (Corneille 277). On
a un autre paradoxe—il faut qu’il tue le père de sa dame pour avoir la valeur qu’elle requiert.
Il faut qu’il regagne son honneur, en tout cas.
Malgré sa tristesse de perdre Chimène, il n’y a aucune doute dans son âme que le
devoir prend la plus grande importance. Don Rodrigue est donc un exemple superbe du héros
cornélien. Bien qu’il lutte avec ses émotions, il ne connait pas une réelle hésitation entre le
devoir familial et l’amour particulier. Maintenant qu’il a restauré l’honneur de son nom, il attend le bon-vouloir de Chimène pour être pardonné. Il offre sa vie et son service—si elle veut
qu’il meurt, qu’il se batte en duel, qu’il s’engage dans l’armée, qu’il disparaisse, il le fera. Le
code l’attache à la volonté de Chimène.
Dans le cas de Chimène, cependant, son hésitation entre le chemin éthique et le chemin particulier est plus visible. C’est évident qu’elle brûle d’amour pour Rodrique, mais elle
ne peut pas oublier l’image de son père, saignant à mort dans ses bras. Elle approche le vrai
héros nietzschéen dans son désir violent d’épouser Rodrigue, mais elle reste dans le domaine
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du tragique par son incapacité de choisir le particulier au-dessus du devoir. Comme Don
Diègue, Chimène explique son problème sous l’angle d’un problème social—sa vengeance
serait dans le meilleur intérêt de Castille. Elle essaie de persuader Don Fernand que le meurtre de son père représente un affront pour lui parce que le Comte était un homme de même
rang et il était un homme de grand mérite dans le royaume. Ce n’est pas qu’une affaire tout
à fait personnelle. Donc, elle dit au roi que son cours d’action rejaillit sur lui et sur Castille:
“Immolez, non à moi, mais à votre couronne,/ Mais à votre grandeur, mais à votre personne;/
Immolez, dis-je, Sire, au bien de tout l’état” (Corneille 271). À la lumière de cette déclaration, le crime de Don Rodrigue devient un crime contre le royaume et contre l’honneur de ses
citoyens.
Mais, pour Chimène, tuer et réfuser d’épouser Don Rodrigue est équivalent à faire
le plus grand sacriﬁce de soi. Si elle se venge, elle se suicidera ou habitera dans un cloître.
Elle l’aime passionnément et son amour est la source de son déséspoir. Elle veut choisir cet
amour et elle-même—elle offre le compromis du duel entre Don Sanche et Don Rodrigue (un
moyens éthique de résoudre le problème parce qu’il permet une résolution honorable de la
querelle), et elle dit à son amant de fuir au lieu d’être puni. Elle approche la satisfaction de sa
passion, mais elle est continuellement paralysée par son adhésion au code et par son désir de
réhabilitation du nom de son père. Par exemple, elle dit à Rodrigue qu’il doit gagner le duel
pour qu’ils puissent se marier, mais, l’ayant dit, elle sort de la chambre, honteuse.
Il semble qu’elle a une âme très forte, et dans l’univers cornélien, c’est vrai. Mais
vraiment, on voit facilement que le choix le plus difﬁcile pour Chimène est le choix de soi.
Ce qu’elle considère sa force n’est que sa faiblesse. Nietzsche reconnait que le choix de
l’individu est le plus dur. Etre seul en dehors de l’état est quelque chose d’affreux—une sorte
de mort. Dans Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, il se réfère aux temps plus anciens, quand “there
was nothing more frightful than being single” (Nietzsche 138) et “being alone was bound up
with every misery and every fear” (Nietzsche 139). Chimène ne pense qu’à la honte et au
mépris qu’elle recevra si elle ne résiste pas à son amour. Elle voit sa résistance comme une
qualité—elle est une ﬁlle loyale à son père et une bonne citoyenne—elle trouve mal que des
criminals ne soient pas poursuivis dans “un lieu de franchise” (Corneille 289). Elle pense que
sa vrai valeur est dans l’éthique.
Donc, de tous les personnages dans Le Cid, Chimène est la plus éloignée de la
grande santé; elle voit le chemin de l’individu mais elle le réfuse. Elle reconnait son grand
amour, mais elle le rejette et, en le faisant, elle se rejette aussi. Nietzsche considère cette
dénégation de soi comme une maladie, et que l’effort à cacher cette maladie (ici, derrière
l’honneur) n’est qu’un déguisement: “What can it matter to us with what kind of tinsel the
sick dress up their weakness? Let them display it as their virtue” (Nietzsche 168). Peut-être
que Chimène perdra de son insistance sur la vengeance pendant l’année que Don Rodrigue
passera à l’armée du roi, mais dans l’action de la pièce, elle ne secoue pas le joug de l’éthique;
elle ne réalise pas la grande santé du héros nietzschéen.
On peut dire la même chose de tous les personnages qui placent leurs devoirs avant
leurs désirs et leurs propres valeurs. En réfusant de se choisir, ils renforcent le système qui a
déterminé leurs actions. Ils maintiennent leur esclavage à l’état, à l’honneur, et à toute autre
considération sauf eux-mêmes. Nietzsche a dit que la faiblesse éthique n’est qu’un “instinct
of weakness which, if it is true, does not create religions, metaphysical systems, and convictions of all sorts—but conserves them” (Nietzsche 154). Donc, il faut voir ces héros corné-

liens comme ce qu’ils sont. Pour trouver un vrai héros, un héros au-dessus des masses, il faut
chercher le personnage du Comte.
Notes
1. Berg, R. J., ed. Littérature Française: Textes et Contextes. Vol. 1. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1994. À cause de quelques omissions par R. J. Berg, les vers et les
scènes ne sont pas numérotés comme une version complète de Le Cid. Donc, je cite la page
du texte de la citation.
2. “The herd” est le terme général que Nietzsche emploie pour décrire la société et l’intérêt
collectif. Ce terme au un sens négatif suggère que les participants dans “le herd” agissent
sans penser, selon ce que font les autres.
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Exploring the Tapestry: Oedipa’s
Embrace of the Journey in The
Crying of Lot 49
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Recognizing the Fantasy: Capitalist America
Oedipa slowly recognizes the symbolic nature of the overriding Californian consumer culture and the dissenting voices such a culture hides. Oedipa’s reluctance to face the instability of the system can be partially explained by her past relationship with Pierce Inverarity.
Inverarity represented the ideal citizen of the consumer society. Indeed, he was a millionaire
who virtually built the city of San Narciso; he owned the major company that employs the
city’s citizens as well as most of the land on which they live. More importantly, Inverarity is
never presented above the symbolic level in the novel. The reader, and perhaps Oedipa, never
encounters a real person in Inverarity. In fact, one of the few direct depictions of his character
is a phone conversation with Oedipa wherein Inverarity takes on the personas of a Transylvanian Consulate, a comic-Negro, a Gestapo ofﬁcer and Lamont Cranston (Pynchon 2-3).
Nothing in the novel indicates that Inverarity ever used his real voice. Without an individual
persona, Inverarity exists entirely in the fantastical world of capitalism. Oedipa’s run-in with
Mexican anarchist Jesús Arrabal later in the novel supports such a reading. Upon meeting
Arrabal on vacation in Mexico, Inverarity once again played a part, this time that of “the rich,
obnoxious gringo.” From this collision of ideals, Arrabal describes Inverarity as a miracle,
“another world’s intrusion into this one…he is too exactly and without ﬂaw what we ﬁght…as
terrifying to me as a Virgin appearing to an Indian” (Pynchon 97). Inverarity is the perfect
capitalist with no holes, no gap, no void in his persona that would question such a system.
Within the company of Inverarity’s pure fantasy, Oedipa is stiﬂed by the ideology he
represents. Mark Conroy ﬁnds the repetition of consumer culture in Oedipa’s relationship with
both Inverarity and Metzger. In a capitalist system, “the ideal self-image is in its essence the
functional equivalent of someone else’s ideal image, which the consumer then appropriates
for his or her own” (Conroy 49). Such is the case with Inverarity: he does not have a distinct
image but instead takes on stereotypes present in the prevailing society. This image is then

moore

Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 depicts a society based upon an elaborate
system dependent on language to regulate people’s wants and desires. Oedipa, the novel’s
heroine, confronts fantasies that both support and attempt to undermine the predominant
capitalist system. While sifting through these conﬂicting narratives advanced by the men in
the novel, Oedipa faces the theory that all fantasies contain ﬂaws or voids, what Lacanian psychoanalysis designates as the Traumatic Real. Though she recognizes the reality of the latter
concept, Oedipa renounces both the other characters’ fantasies and the philosophy of embracing the Real as a source of truth. As Oedipa begins to assert her own desire into the symbolic
order, Pynchon contends that the search for meaning and truth is the vital aspect of existence.
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presented to Oedipa for her to adopt. The problem of transference then becomes apparent
– “that…this mechanical reproduction is mistaken for renewal is one of the crucial features
of the narcissistic self of consumer society” (Conroy 49). Oedipa ﬁnds herself in this trap
while in Mexico with Inverarity. She had mistaken the relationship as liberating; however, she
recognizes the mere repetition of the relationship through a painting by Remedios Varo. The
painting, titled “Bordando el Manto Terrestre,” depicts Rapunzel-like women locked in a tower weaving a tapestry that is the world. This scene reveals to Oedipa “that what she stood on
had only been woven together a couple thousands miles away in her own tower, was only by
accident known as Mexico, and so Pierce had taken her away from nothing, there’d been no
escape” (Pynchon 11). Oedipa, then, only imagined the renewal in the relationship. Instead,
her alliance with the pure representation of the system only further immerses her in a deﬁned
place within a society. Oedipa has not obtained the freedom to pursue her own desire (or even
Inverarity’s desire) because the symbolic level conceals the Real, or the realm of desire. Without a ﬂaw in Inverarity’s symbolic order, no desire can be present. Thus, her relationship with
Inverarity was not an escape but a replication of past conﬁnement.
Oedipa completes the repetition when she returns home, taking her place in the overriding system by marrying Mucho Wendell Maas and becoming a housewife. It is not until
Inverarity’s letter spurs her affair with Metzger that she ﬁnds herself once again faced with the
capitalist fantasy. Metzger, as Inverarity’s lawyer, is an advocate of the patriarchal, capitalist
lifestyle as well; however, unlike Inverarity, Metzger cannot contain the gaps of the system
within his personality. Pynchon indicates this by an interruption in the narrative of Cashiered,
a movie Metzger starred in as a child. The storyline of the movie, now incomprehensible,
must be questioned. Initially, the confusion of the Cashiered narrative and the resulting
questioning is not transferred onto the narrative of a patriarchal society. Indeed, they bolster
one another; Metzger, the dominant male, has the answers to the gaps in the movie, and in
such a way patriarchy can maintain its hierarchy. However, Metzger’s answers are superﬁcial,
obvious ploys to seduce Oedipa and reveal a possible level of desire in Inverarity. After he has
“laid” Oedipa, Metzger tells her that Inverarity believed she “wouldn’t be easy” (Pynchon 30).
Such a comment links Inverarity to the sexual desires displayed by Metzger, showing them to
be the catalyst of the capitalist story. The submerged desires of the system are revealed and,
consequently, Oedipa begins to recognize that the fantasy does not contain pure answers, but
ones tainted by personal desires and that the fantasy itself is born from such desires.
Fantasy as Escape: The literal symbolic
Following her trip to Mexico and her new awareness of her conﬁnement in society,
Oedipa attempts to reconcile herself to her place (or tower) within the fantasy through her
marriage to Mucho. Mucho, however, is ﬂeeing from the idea of a paramount fantasy. He
uses words at a literal level to stabilize the fantasy and overcome any possible inadequacies.
He is terriﬁed that perhaps these words lack real meaning. For instance, Mucho’s recurring
nightmare features the National Automobile Dealers’ Association (NADA) sign at the used
car lot where he used to work. Mucho dreams of “just this creaking metal sign that said nada,
nada, nada against the blue sky” (Pynchon 118). Nada, an alternative for nothing, indicates
Mucho’s fear that words have no real signiﬁcance. He shrinks from the idea that truth lies
beyond the words and is in fact inexpressible. Mucho wishes to bolster the fantasy through
its primary linguistic devices in order to convince himself of the reality of an infallible nar-

Faith in Fantasy: The system of the symbolic
After confronting the breakdown of the system caused by her relationship with
Metzger, Oedipa tries to assume a faith in fantasy that ignores or allows for the presence
of inconsistencies. John Nefastis and Mike Fallopian present ideologies that ﬁll the gaps of
the prevailing capitalist system with corresponding symbolic explanations. However, they
overlook the ﬂaws in these replacement fantasies and propose a blind faith in their fantasies.
Thus, these men differ from Hilarius and Mucho in that they do not search for an all-knowing
subject and hardly try to discover the implications of their beliefs. Rather, these two men allow for what Gregory Flaxman calls distortion (45), a reference to the inadequacy of language
to confer an idea or story from person to person. Nefastis and Fallopian not only allow for
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rative. He ultimately achieves these ends by the use of LSD. In a drugged state, Mucho can
connect the entirety of the world, without acknowledging a fundamental lack, through the use
of language. He tells Oedipa, “Everybody who says the same words is the same person if the
spectra are the same only they happen differently in time, you dig? But the time is arbitrary.
You pick your zero point anywhere you want, that way you can shufﬂe each person’s time
line sideways till they all coincide” (Pynchon 116-117). With such a theory, Mucho is capable
of connecting every person on earth by uttering “rich, chocolaty goodness” and ignoring the
“nada” of language.
Because Mucho’s theory of assimilation through language is immediately unacceptable to Oedipa, she pursues therapy with Dr. Hilarius in order to better incorporate herself into
the patriarchal fantasy. Hilarius initially echoes Mucho’s form of escape by urging Oedipa to
join his studies on the effects of LSD. However, by the end of the novel, Hilarius has changed
his position. In the past, he had not allowed for the inability of language to confront all mental
activity. He “tried to cultivate a faith in the literal truth of everything [Freud] wrote, even in
the idiocies and contradictions…and part of me, must really have wanted to believe…that
the unconscious would be like any other room, once the light was let in” (Pynchon 109-110).
When this dependence on language inevitably fails (Hilarius never took the drug he prescribed for his patients), Hilarius creates a paranoid fantasy “where at least I know who I am
and who the others are” (Pynchon 111). This paranoia manifests itself in Hilarius’s belief that
he is being pursued for war crimes committed while working with Nazi physicists, a belief
that also ignores the possible faults in the capitalist fantasy. His split with such a literal reading of Freud and the talking cure is quite right; however, he misjudges the ability of a different
hierarchy to explain away the problems of the old system. Instead of accepting the limitations
of symbolic systems in general, Hilarius suspects that the situation is unique to himself and
treats the decay of the symbolic as if it were an instance of personal persecution. Indeed, his
belief that he is under attack is as absurd as believing in the contradictions in Freud’s texts. It
merely misplaces the capacity for objective knowledge from language to an unknown pursuer.
Oedipa, however, has difﬁculty in accepting an all-knowing agent. She considers the
possibility that Inverarity has formed a plot in his will to fool her; however, as I shall discuss
shortly, she is unable to believe that he can completely explain the underworld she glimpses.
Consequently, both of Oedipa’s counterparts in her hometown, Kinneret, have failed to help
her assimilate into the patriarchal system both before and after her affair with Metzger. Oedipa cannot accept a psychotic stance to words like Mucho nor the paranoia of an omniscient
other like Hilarius.
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this distortion through the multitude of possible interpretations but also through the lack of
interpretation.
For example, Fallopian focuses on the process of the system rather than its meaning.
His narrative includes the W.A.S.T.E. system, an alternative to the government-run postal service, but he cannot provide Oedipa with a meaning behind the system. Indeed, the messages
sent through the service are mere words. For Fallopian this is not as important as keeping the
system running: “’It’s the principle…to keep it up to some kind of reasonable volume, each
member has to send at least one letter a week through the Yoyodyne system’” (Pynchon 39).
Here, the system of the symbolic assumes the focal point rather than the words themselves.
In Fallopian’s fantasy, it is the process of communicating that anchors the narrative rather
than the verbal story. It is this process that takes on the aura of rebellion rather than a cause
that spurs the revolt. Such a stance is supported by Fallopian’s ignorance of the origins of the
Peter Pinguid rebellion, the event that established the society in which Fallopian participates.
The story itself does not matter – he does not “make scripture out of it” (Pynchon 36) – it
is enough that the rebellion happened, though the winner and the cause of the rebellion are
unclear. Likewise, Fallopian uses an act of rebellion, the use of an alternative mail system,
to reject the inadequacies of the patriarchal system and to provide a deﬁnitive reason for the
inadequacy of that system. Fallopian does not trouble himself to understand the import in his
rebellion or the speciﬁc ﬂaws of the system against which he rebels. Thus, like Mucho and Hilarius, Fallopian attempts to provide answers to the faults in the prevailing American society.
However, in opposition to his Kinneret counterparts, Fallopian does not ignore the gaps in his
own symbolic fantasy nor does he believe these gaps to hide any inexpressible meaning. In
fact, he glories in the very chaos of the incomplete story.
Similarly, Nefastis presents a blind faith in his system surrounding Maxwell’s
Demon, a being in a box that can sort molecules. According to his theology, a “sensitive” can
communicate with the Demon and cause a miraculous creation of energy. Nefastis’s belief
relies on a reordering of a closed system and a linguistic communication, a metaphor. The
formulas for entropy and information theory resemble one another and, when spliced together,
create a metaphor that would allow communication to increase the order in a closed thermodynamic system and create heat energy that can be proved through the objective manifestation
of the heat transfer. Oedipa, however, immediately questions faith in a system created entirely
of words. Feeling like a heretic, she asks, “but what…if the Demon only exists because the
two equations look alike? Because of the metaphor?” (Pynchon 85). She cannot believe, as
Nefastis does, that the metaphor stands for a larger entity, a larger meaning. Indeed, because
the very origin of the system lies in its symbolic manifestation, there can be no underlying
cause of the system. Like Mucho, Nefastis has taken words as the literal meaning. However,
unlike Mucho, Nefastis’s system can see the possibility of the system not containing the answers. Indeed, Nefastis has not encountered a “sensitive.” Thus, like Fallopian, his belief is in
the act of believing and not in the truth of the system.
Oedipa’s rejection of a system based on a belief in the workings of that system ultimately stems from the confusion and disorder believing creates. This disorder is innate within
the idea of Maxwell’s Demon and any sort of system-based belief. Oedipa ﬁnds that “imposing patterns upon random, unordered data produces more disorder in the process” (Leland 50).
By trying to place explanations upon the Trystero system she encounters, she only becomes
more confused. Oedipa sees her situation as a multiplied version of Nefastis’s. Nefastis has
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Driblette’s Subjective Real
In contrast to the other men along her journey, Driblette does not present Oedipa
with a new fantasy. Instead, he offers a theory that rejects fantasy as a form of covering the
meaning of experience, proposing that placement of an experience within the symbolic world
strips it of the very essence of living. This essence is presented as a ﬂeeting recognition of
an unspeakable, abstract element of being. Driblette’s rendering of the play The Courier’s
Tragedy attempts to enact and produce a collision with this essence through silence, acknowledging that meaning cannot be spoken or sensed: “Heretofore the naming of names has gone
on either literally or as metaphor. But now…a new mode of expression takes over. It can only
be called a kind of ritual reluctance. Certain things, it is made clear, will not be spoken aloud;
certain events will not be shown on stage” (Pynchon 55). Thus, Pynchon proposes a new
paradigm for Oedipa to pursue. Rather than seeking a fantasy to replace the ﬂawed American
system embodied in Pierce Inverarity, Oedipa can now seek engagement with the Real. This
“new mode of expression” provides Oedipa with another possible source of meaning outside
any narrative fantasy.
Moreover, this philosophy of an incommunicable meaning, by its very nature, is a
subjective experience. When Oedipa tries to coerce Driblette into explaining his directorial
decisions to her, he refuses, arguing that the meaning she is searching for is not something he
can put into words but is a part of himself. Indeed, he urges her to look past the symbolic:
“you’re like the Puritans about the Bible. So hung up with words, words. You know
where the play exists…in [my mind]. That’s what I’m for. To give the spirit ﬂesh.
The words, who cares? They’re rote noises to hold line bashes with, to get past the
one barriers around an actor’s memory, right? But the reality is in this head.
(Pynchon 62)
Thus, Driblette does not try to convince Oedipa of an overarching, objective being that supplies meaning; there is no text or conversation that could translate the purpose of the play to
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made the coincidence of the identical formulas “respectable with the help of Maxwell’s
Demon.” Oedipa, however, is faced with a “metaphor of God knew how many parts…had
nothing but a sound, a word, Trystero, to hold them together” (Pynchon 87). Oedipa ﬁnds that
this word, in its subjective nature, is a ﬂimsier connection than the Demon. However, this
discovery arises from Oedipa’s questioning of the symbolic order as the only available level
of meaning. But she eventually ﬁnds that, even if the metaphor of the Demon were to be true,
this truth could not provide the answers for which Oedipa is searching, creating instead what
Anne Mangel calls a “perpetual motion machine” (90). Such a machine would only provide
limitless interpretations of the true metaphor. Mangel sees this already beginning in Oedipa’s
search: “The clues she gathers yield more clues in an inﬁnite process. Opening out into more
and more suggestions, they yield no conclusion” (90). Language then cannot provide such
connections because they always lead to more metaphors and explanations. Indeed, Oedipa
senses that there are an inﬁnite number of interpretations that arise from the linguistic and
symbolic clues she discovers. Pynchon, by providing her (and the reader) with so much room
for interpretation, creates a situation where certainty is unattainable. Thus, Oedipa cannot
bring herself to believe blindly in a system based wholly on the act of communication or a coincidence within this communication. For her, such a conviction would ignore the ﬂaws innate
in communication.
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Oedipa. Instead, Driblette points to a subjective aspect in each person, to the truth of reality
resting in personal experience rather than in others. He tells Oedipa, “If I were to dissolve
here…be washed down the drain into the Paciﬁc, what you saw tonight would vanish too.
You, that part of you so concerned, God knows how, with that little world [of the play], would
also vanish” (Pynchon 62). Oedipa has experienced a piece of Driblette by watching the play;
however, that piece cannot be understood or examined, but instead remains within Driblette’s
being. In this way, Oedipa’s previous interactions in the novel are merely the meeting of
others’ fantasies that have been made into their personal realities. Driblette encourages her to
encounter these realities as her own personal experiences and “project” a reality of her own.
His philosophy is to confront the voids ingrained within any fantasy rather than uselessly
strive to decipher them.
This philosophy is ultimately enacted in Driblette’s suicide by walking into the
Paciﬁc Ocean. The ocean is described in the novel as the keeper of the Real. As Oedipa approaches San Narciso for the ﬁrst time she notes that beyond the symbolic circuit of the city:
lurked the sea, the unimaginable Paciﬁc, the one to which all surfers, beach pads,
sewage disposal schemes, tourist incursions, stunned homosexuality, chartered
ﬁshing are irrelevant, the hole left by the moon’s tearing-free and monument to her
exile, you could not hear or even smell this but it was there, something tidal began
to reach feelers in past eyes and eardrums, perhaps to arouse fractions of brain
current your most gossamer microelectrode is yet too gross for ﬁnding.
(Pynchon 40-41)
The sea that Oedipa could not recognize with her senses is the Real that Driblette tries to
produce with the absence of sensual display in The Courier’s Tragedy. However, the sea of
the Real does present itself in an abstract, subtle hint through “fractions of brain current.” I
read this to relate to the indescribability of the Real, the ability to encounter but not explain
or understand. Moreover, this massive presence of the void ignores systems and methods of
identiﬁcation that develop around its edges. Indeed, these symbolic artiﬁces and fantasies, Oedipa believes, can be “integrated or assumed…into some more general truth” that is the “true
Paciﬁc” (Pynchon 41). Though Oedipa comes to acknowledge the lack of “general truth,” her
sense that the faults in all fantasies lay within the void is correct. The sea, then, is identiﬁed
as the home of the Real, and Driblette, by walking into it, merges with the Real, becoming the
enactor of his belief that meaning can only be found within the void.
Oedipa’s Traumatic Encounter
Ultimately, Oedipa rejects direct contact with the Real. She experiences the silent
void Driblette presented in his play in her night of silent passivity in San Francisco. She
confronts the lack throughout the city by merely witnessing the side of society that does not
ﬁt within the narrative provided by Inverarity and Metzger. Oedipa is reluctant to ﬁt this
underside of the city into another system surrounding the Trystero. Instead she adopts a theory
of silence for the night that, as Mark Hawthorne points out, “enables her to transﬁgure mere
words” overcoming her need to name and understand (87). Her vow not to immediately deﬁne
her situation allows Oedipa to encounter Driblette’s Real, culminating in her meeting with
an old sailor. Rather than use words, Oedipa is “overcome all at once by a need to touch him,
as if she could not believe in him, or would not remember him, without it” (Pynchon 102).
Through this meeting, Oedipa recognizes the subjective reality Driblette proposed. She imag-

Oedipa’s Rejection of the Real
When Cohen provides Oedipa with yet another clue, a possible encounter with a
stamp collector interested in the Trystero stamps that Inverarity collected, Oedipa deﬁnitively
rejects the Real. She endows the stamp collector with the potential to be the ﬂawless incarnation of the Trystero narrative (much as Inverarity had been the pure embodiment of the
capitalist system) or the catalyst for another encounter with the Real. Oedipa then turns back
to the clues she has been presented throughout the novel and her choice between fantasy and
the Real. She gets drunk and drives with her headlights off down the freeway, an attempt at
suicide. Unlike Driblette, however, she is unable to merge with the Real that has now moved
from the Paciﬁc Ocean to engulf America. Indeed, Oedipa can no longer ﬁnd the distinction
between the two:
She stood between the public booth and the rented car, in the night, her
isolation complete, and tried to face toward the sea. She had lost her bearing.
She turned, pivoting on one stacked heel, could ﬁnd no mountains either. As
if there could be no barriers between herself and the rest of the land. San
Narciso at that moment lost…gave up its residue of uniqueness for her;
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ines the sailor’s mattress burning and killing not only the sailor but also “the set of all men
who had slept on it, whatever their lives had been, would truly cease to be, forever, when the
mattress burned” (Pynchon 104). These men’s lives will lose all episodes and wisdom connected with the mattress once it is gone. Likewise, Oedipa will lose part of her engagement
with the mattress and the sailor through the same process. Here, Pynchon directs our attention
back to the idea Driblette ﬁrst advanced: life is contained within individual minutes that can
only be felt within that speciﬁc minute. Outside of the moment, the meaning is lost. Gregory
Flaxman, also proposing a psychoanalytic reading of the novel, ﬁnds that this relational void,
this loss, this death is the very clash humans seek to overcome:
[Oedipa] encounters the mattress in all its grotesquery as the phenomenal intrusion
of the Thing into reality. Irrupting into exteriority, the Thing pulsates and swells with
all the ﬂuids of jouissance. Oedipa stands in front of the mattress-Thing only to
realize that the Real of desire is not desirable, that she has come face to face with the
very antithesis of fantasized possibility or Sovereign Good. (54)
Following Flaxman, we can see that Oedipa confronts the unspeakable void of desire that
Driblette alluded to. However, she ﬁnds herself helpless in the situation, unable to keep the
sailor, the mattress, and their meeting from going up in ﬂames. Moreover, Oedipa herself, as a
distinct entity, is lost in the ﬁre. Flaxman’s reading suggests that Driblette’s encouragement to
pursue the void would not be a satisfying answer for Oedipa. Indeed, this conﬂict proves more
frightening than the choice of a paradigm on which to rest belief.
Consequently, Oedipa’s search remains stalled after this confrontation. Her experiences following that night are ﬁlled with more clues and possible narratives supplied by
Genghis Cohen and Emory Bortz. However, Oedipa has become “reluctant about following
anything up,” ignoring the clues, “anxious that her revelation not expand beyond a certain
point. Lest, possibly, it grow larger than she and assume her to itself” (Pynchon 137). Oedipa
avoids looking for answers because she is no longer sure she wants them. She worries that
she will lose herself, helpless in another confrontation with the Real or insigniﬁcant as a mere
piece of the narrative – both threaten to engulf her.
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became a name again, was assumed back into the American continuity of
crust and mantel. Pierce Inverarity was dead. (Pynchon 146-147)
This passage denotes Oedipa’s return to the symbolic. Panicked that the entire world has
become the Real, and she, within it, insigniﬁcant, Oedipa returns to a world of names without
meaning. Simultaneously, she relinquishes the idea of an overriding fantasy of Inverarity’s
America. San Narciso, the city of Inverarity’s power, is engulfed in the void of America,
which has been engulfed by the Real of the Paciﬁc. Thus, Inverarity and the fantasy he supported are lost, dead, devoid of possible meaning.
Oedipa’s choices then are to embrace the paranoia of a Trystero plot or become lost
in the lack of fantasy and immersed in the Real. However, both options provide equally stiﬂing futures. Oedipa, in the plot mastered by the will of Inverarity, would be a mere pawn to
another’s will. If the reality of the Trystero clues are true but a mere coincidence, Oedipa will
be engulfed in the Real as she was when faced with the loss of narrative in her encounter with
the sailor’s mattress. Oedipa considers these options in terms of a matrix of ones and zeroes:
Another mode of meaning behind the obvious or none. Either Oedipa in the orbiting
ecstasy of a true paranoia or a real Tristero. For there either was some Tristero
beyond the appearance of the legacy of America, or there was just America and if
there was just America then it seemed the only way she could continue, and manage
to be at all relevant to it, was as an alien, unfurrowed, assumed full circle into some
paranoia. (Pynchon 150-151)
America here functions as the Real and Trystero as the conspiracy. Oedipa believes that the
only way to escape the burdens of one system is to accept the other. But Oedipa is not satisﬁed with choosing between another’s reality and the lack of a symbolic reality. Through the
very ﬂuctuation in her decision-making, Oedipa maintains her right to choose a future and,
consequently, her own distinct identity.
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Oedipa’s Return to the Symbolic
The next morning, Oedipa again begins her pursuit of answers, attempting to ﬁnd
the identity of the mystery stamp collector. She attends the auction without having made a
choice of paranoia or assumption into the Real. Instead, Oedipa realizes that the search for the
answer to this duality deﬁnes the self. Oedipa, while searching for the answers to clues, while
actively questioning the hierarchy of either the capitalist or Tristero system, is able to assume
an identity of her own. In her discussion of Oedipa’s triumph over a patriarchal conﬁnement,
Cathy Davidson notes that “she has come to execute her own will. That last meaning, however, is calculatingly ambiguous” (49). Davidson proposes that the ambiguous end indicates
possibilities of Oedipa’s death or arrival at the ultimate truth. However, I read these possibilities to ﬂuctuate between Oedipa’s death through the loss of her identity by accepting some
sort of truth or the continuance of her search for clues.
Pynchon ultimately presents the reader with this latter choice. The book ends
without the reader gaining ultimate knowledge of the answer to Oedipa’s search or even her
conclusions. Oedipa then is capable of pursuing both the answer and avoiding the answer
indeﬁnitely. Likewise the reader (and critic) is capable of projecting a multitude of individual
narratives into the space Pynchon created in the novel without assurance of the truth of their
narrative. Oedipa is searching for the search, the level in which she is capable of maintaining
her individuality. While not denying outright the possibility of truth in any of the narratives
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Notes
1. Inverarity, by existing only on the level of the symbolic word, denies reality. As Slavoj
Zizek proposes, “Reality is nothing but an embodiment of a certain blockage in the process
of symbolization. For reality to exist, something must be left unspoken” (Looking Awry 45).
Inverarity does not present a blockage in his discourse, and, thus, Oedipa cannot encounter the
unspoken reality.
2. This is indeed a replication because of the oppressive role Oedipa plays in this relationship
as she does in others. Oedipa, looking at the tower, sees her lack of power in her relationship
with Inverarity. Cathy Davidson discusses the patriarchal dominance over Oedipa and deﬁnes
Oedipa’s tower as “[male] assumptions about Oedipa – seeing her only as wife, mistress,
experimental subject, sex object” (45). Davidson convincingly argues that Oedipa overcomes
these roles along with their restrictions by taking on both male and female aspects during her
journey.
3. The light referred to here is Freud’s belief that talking would trigger manifestations of unconscious desires, what Anna.O., an early patient of Freud’s, called the talking cure.
4. Such a fantasy contains a ﬂaw, pointed out by Slavoj Zizek: “The paranoiac’s mistake does
not consist in his radical disbelief, in his conviction that there is a universal deception – here
he is quite right, the symbolic order is ultimately the order of a fundamental deception – but
rather, in his belief in a hidden agent who manipulates this deception” (Looking Awry 81).
5. Edward Mendelson provides a comprehensive discussion of Pynchon’s allusions to faith
through metaphor in “The Sacred, the Profane, and The Crying of Lot 49.” Working from
Pynchon’s deﬁnition of a metaphor as “a thrust at truth and a lie, depending on where you
were: inside, safe or outside, lost” (Pynchon 105), Mendelson likened being inside the metaphor to belief in the metaphor. Likewise, being “lost” outside is likened to a lack of faith.
Nefastis is obviously devoted to the metaphor and thus sees the truth of it. Oedipa, however,
“did not know where she was” (Pynchon 105), and so she struggles either to believe or see the
metaphor from the outside as a violent lie produced by a paradigm to form a system.
6. Oedipa’s declaration that Inverarity was dead at the end of the novel when he has been acknowledged as dead throughout the novel is odd. However, I read this statement as a symbolization of the complete annihilation of Oedipa’s belief in the capitalist system. After her night
amongst the disinherited, she can no longer see the truth in such a system. Pierce, as “Master”
of that system, dies along with her belief in it. However, “the suspension of the Master, which
reveals impotence, in no way gives rise to liberating effects: the knowledge that ‘the Other
doesn’t exist’ imposes on the subject an even more radical servitude than the traditional subordination to the full authority of the Master” (Zizek, Plague 158). Oedipa is thrown into a more
conﬁning world where, rather than having inﬁnite choices, she has none.

aegis 2004

presented to her by the men she encounters, Oedipa refuses to accept them without question
and revision. Thus, she continues her search, a decision wherein, though she is not let out of
fantasy’s tower, she is given knowledge of the tower and free reign to explore the tapestry
created within it.
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“To Any Dead Ofﬁcer”: A Study of
the War Poetry of Siegfried Sassoon
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Prior to the Battle of the Somme
Although he was neither well known nor held in very high acclaim, Sassoon had had
some poetry published prior to World War I. His most notable work, The Daffodil Murderer,
was published in 1913. While satirical in nature, “The Daffodil Murderer” and some of his
other pre-war poems, such as “Hyacinth” and “Amyntas,” were pastoral pieces.2
In light of the strong nationalism throughout England and much of Europe, it is not
surprising that on August 1, 1914, the day Germany declared war on Russia, Sassoon was
the ﬁrst of the British War Poets to join the army.3 Sassoon ﬁrst joined the Sussex Yeomanry
because he loved and wanted to stay with his horse. His love of horses was well known, and
in September he was asked to temper an ofﬁcer’s new horse. While doing so, the horse threw
Sassoon, and he suffered a badly broken arm.4 This break caused him to miss deportation to
France with the rest of his unit, and he remained in England.
In May of 1915, Sassoon made 2nd Lieutenant and decided to switch regiments.
Through connections he had made, he joined the Royal Welch Fusiliers. The Royal Welch
Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion, 7th Division of the British 4th Army5 was a distinguished
unit within the British Army and had fought in all the major battles of World War I up to that
point.6
His transference to the Royal Welch Fusiliers coincided with Robert Graves’ enlistment. Robert Graves, also a published poet prior to the war though not well known, proved to
have a strong inﬂuence upon Sassoon. When Sassoon and Graves met, Graves was already
writing about the ugliness of the war and encouraged Sassoon to do the same. Graves was
attempting to demonstrate the ugliest side of the war, while Sassoon was still painting it as a
glorious endeavor.
Indeed, when Sassoon ﬁnally reached the front in 1916, he described himself at the
time as a “happy warrior.” This belief may have been a false one, a belief that he himself pro-
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The First World War affected many different aspects of society, including literature.
In particular, an especially large group of poets expressed their feelings about the war. In
the British Army alone there were many talented poets who had their work regarding the war
published, in some cases post mortem. Some of the more famous British War Poets, as they
came to be known, were Isaac Rosenberg, Wilfred Owen, Charles Sorley, Rupert Brooke,
and Edward Thomas, all of whom died during the war. Although both Siegfried Sassoon and
Robert Graves lived through the conﬂict and continued to write, it was Sassoon who became
well known for his verse. A detailed study of Sassoon’s verse written during and after the war
reveals a shifting view in his attitudes: prior to the battle of the Somme he wrote in favor of
the war, during the post-Somme/Craiglockhart period he wrote against it, and following the
war he wrote against all war in general. Later in his life, however, during World War II, his
views shifted once again, ultimately making a full circle.1
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moted. As he puts it in his semi-ﬁctionalized memoirs, “It was that period, before the Somme
battles began, which now seemed to have acquired an insidious attractiveness. No, in their
reality I had intensely disliked those times.”7 Either way, his ﬁrst war poem, “Absolution,”
which appeared in The Old-Huntsman and Other Poems, reﬂects his belief in the necessity of
the war for the liberation of Belgium as well as his belief in the great brotherhood that exists
between soldiers:
The anguish of the earth absolves our eyes
Till beauty shines in all that we can see.
War is our scourge, yet war has made us wise
And, ﬁghting for our freedom, we are free.
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Horror of wounds and anger at the foe,
And losses of things desired; all these must pass
We are the happy legion, for we know
Time’s but a golden wind that shakes the grass.
There was an hour when we were loath to part
From life we longed to share no less than others.
Now, having claimed this heritage of heart,
What need we more, my comrades and my brothers?8
Sassoon’s decree, “Fighting for our freedom, we are free,” promotes the idea of ﬁghting for the freedom of occupied Belgium and of rescuing invaded France. The “happy legion”
marches off to war gloriously with the same “heritage of heart.” This poem gloriﬁes the
camaraderie that can develop during war. The imagery, the word choices, and the ideas put
forth in his ﬁrst war poem are anything but anti-war. However, during this early period when
he was new to the front, Sassoon changed from the happy warrior to the vengeful, suicidal
warrior.
In 1915, the Allied forces were involved in the Gallipoli campaign to establish a
strong link with their isolated ally, Russia.9 This continued for almost all of 1915, until the
Allied Forces were ﬁnally forced to retreat after suffering horrendous casualties. The total Allied casualties were approximately 250,000 men;10 among these was Sassoon’s brother, Hamo.
Sassoon received the devastating news of his brother’s death around the time he learned that
his good friend David Thomas had been shot and killed.11 Shortly after these deaths, Sassoon
started volunteering to go on as many raids into No-Man’s Land as he could, earning a reputation for being daring to the point of being suicidal. His recklessness earned him the nickname
“Mad Jack” among his men.12
The effects of these two deaths are also reﬂected in several poems by Sassoon. One
of them is a very emotional piece written for Hamo, “To My Brother.” Here, Sassoon still
puts forth his pro-war feelings, asking his brother not to be ashamed of him as he will go on
ﬁghting and win victory. In another poem where this is evident, “France,” Sassoon stresses
the glories of France and how worthy She is to ﬁght and to die for: “And they are fortunate,
who ﬁght/For gleaming landscapes swept and shafted/And crowned by cloud pavilions
white.”13 Despite the tragedy of losing his brother and close friend, Sassoon still adhered to
the idea that the war was being fought for a noble cause, such as sustaining France, and that
those serving in the army were fortunate to be doing so.
Sassoon was also beginning to paint the war realistically rather than as an abstract
ideal, probably because of his ﬁrst-hand experience with it. His realism is ﬁrst seen in the
poem “Golgotha.” The title itself paints a very foreboding picture of death, since it is the
Hebrew word for “Skull Hill” as well as the place where Christ was cruciﬁed.14 The poem
describes a lonely sentry on duty with only rats for companions:
Through darkness curves a spume of falling ﬂares

The Battle of the Somme and Craiglockhart
The Germans had launched a large attack upon Verdun, a series of forts in France.
Their attack was aimed more at hurting French pride and manpower rather than at gaining
ground or at achieving a strategic objective. The French were under heavy pressure to defend
their forts, and the British forces decided to relieve some of this pressure by launching an attack upon the German Second Army defending the Somme sector.
The British Fourth Army (of which Sassoon’s Fusiliers were part) and Third Army
attacked the Germans on June 24, 1916. The losses on the British side were appalling. On
the ﬁrst day, the British took 60,000 casualties, of which 19,000 died. The total casualties
for the battle were nearly equal at about 615,000 for the Allies (overwhelmingly British) and
650,000 for the Germans. For all this loss, however, the Allies only gained about eight miles
during the entire eighteen-week battle.20
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That ﬂood the ﬁeld with shallow, blanching light.
The huddled sentry stares
On gloom at war with white,
And white receding slow, submerged in gloom.
Guns into mimic thunder burst and boom
The sentry keeps his watch where no one stirs
But the brown rats, the nimble scavengers.15
Indeed, rats in the trenches of World War I were a terrible problem. The rats were attracted to the unburied corpses and the food which was left out. Also, one pair of rats can produce eight-hundred-eighty offspring in one year; with the conditions of the trenches in WWI,
the rats were everywhere.16 This was a problem that troops on the front line had to deal with
just as they dealt with the enemy: daily and brutally. The appearance of rats into the imagery
of his poems is important because it shows a direct shift away from the heroism of war he had
previously promoted. Instead, this poem deals with its ugly reality.
The next remarkable work in Sassoon’s ﬁrst book is “In the Pink,” the ﬁrst true questioning of the war evident in any of his poetry. In the last stanza he writes:
And then he thought: to-morrow night we trudge
Up to the trenches, and my boots are rotten.
Five miles of stodgy clay and freezing sludge,
And everything but wretchedness forgotten.
Tonight he’s in the pink; but soon he’ll die.
And still the war goes on—he don’t know why.17
Aside from the obvious questioning statement of the last line, perhaps the most anti-war aspect of the poem is its use of the word “sludge,” a man-made waste. It shows that the soldier
is thinking, in every deﬁnition of the word, what a waste the war has become.
It is interesting to note that, during the time these poems were written, Sassoon
received a Military Cross for a night raid he led into No-Man’s Land. He had taken no German prisoners, but Sassoon had successfully brought back all of his men, including the dead.
Regarding the Military Cross, Sassoon noted, “The M.C. was a comfort to me. It was a deﬁnite personal possession to be lived up to.”18 Even though Sassoon had started writing poetry
displaying the human suffering caused by the war, he continued to ﬁght and did so superbly.
More than that, he was still rather proud of his accomplishments.
Speaking to this seeming contradiction, in his article, “For You May Touch Him
Not,” James Campbell explores the complex question of active passivity regarding Siegfried
Sassoon and Wilfred Owen. Campbell deﬁnes “active passivity” as a war participant speaking out against the war, but still ﬁghting. He argues that the “trench ofﬁcer” (as he refers to
Owen and Sassoon) embraced passivity because of the suffering of the men whom he led.
Yet at the same time, the responsibility of being an ofﬁcer was often more than he could bear,
resulting in verbal violence against non-combatants and physical violence against the enemy.19
Violence against the enemy, and paradoxically against the British, was about to ascend to an
unprecedented degree and Sassoon would experience it ﬁrst-hand.

aegis 2004

Though Sassoon fought little and his battalion did not suffer heavily in the early part
of the battle, he did observe the ﬁghting and at one point saw his friend killed by a sniper.
As Sassoon recounts in his memoir, he went mad with rage and attacked a German trench by
himself.21 He actually succeeded in taking it over, although, not being able to hold it alone,
he was shortly forced to retire. Once again, here was the conundrum that James Campbell addresses: Sassoon was actively participating in the war while writing against it. While Sassoon
would later emerge to be completely against the war, he would never cease to participate very
violently in the ﬁghting.
Another issue Campbell addresses in his article is the idea of verbal violence against
non-combatants. This idea of verbal violence towards those not participating in the war
or those remaining complacent towards it is seen in poems directed towards the Anglican
Church. Two excellent examples of this are “They” and “Stand-to: Good Friday Morning.”
While “Stand-to” includes more religious questioning, “They” is a more direct attack upon the
Church for supporting the war:
The Bishop tells us: “When the boys come back
They will not be the same; for they’ll have fought
In a just cause: they lead the attack
On Anti-Christ; their comrades’ blood has bought
New right to breed an honorable race,
They have challenged Death and dared him face to face.”
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“We’re none of us the same!” the boys reply.
“For George lost both his legs; and Bill’s stone blind;
Poor Jim’s shot through the lungs and like to die;
And Bert’s gone syphilitic: you’ll not ﬁnd
A chap who’s served that hasn’t found some change.”
And the Bishop said: “The ways of God are strange!”22
Sassoon remarks that while walking home shortly after writing the poem: “[He] actually met
‘the Bishop’ [of London] and he turned a mild shining gaze on [him] and [his] M.C.”23 Reading the poem and Sassoon’s following remark, one almost feels Sassoon’s anger towards this
Bishop who knew nothing of what the front was like, evident in his seeming pride of Sassoon
for ﬁghting and in his encouragement of the war. Sassoon wrote this poem while on sick
leave in England. It was while he was there that he truly began to acknowledge the anti-war
feelings he was experiencing, which he reﬂected in his poetry.
When Sassoon was in England, he had the good fortune to stay with Robert Graves,
who had been wounded in the Battle of the Somme. During this leave, his battalion took
part in an attack upon Delville Wood. The battalion lost 200 men in three days, and Sassoon
likewise lost many of his friends. It was shortly after the news of this battle that Graves was
deemed in good enough health to return to the front, leaving Sassoon alone. He also left
behind a publication, an anti-war propagandist magazine.24
Sassoon began to read this magazine. It stated that “the sons of Europe are being
cruciﬁed on the barbed wire because the misguided masses are shouting for it.”25 These words
stirred something that had been building inside Sassoon, causing him to put the war into
question. As he remarks in Memoirs of an Infantry Ofﬁcer, “Was this really the truth, I wondered […]. I thought of Dick Tiltwood […] Fernby […] Kendle, and all those others whose
violent deaths had saddened my experience. David [Robert Graves] was now returning to be
a candidate for this military martyrdom.”26 He then reﬂects upon all he had seen during the
past years of his service. He speaks of the “Commander with his rows of medal-ribbons,” of
his dead friends, of all the men who had come and gone, and he wonders how many of them
had been killed since then. He reaches the conclusion of his internal conﬂict, for he states,
“Bellicose politicians and journalists were fond of using the word ‘crusade.’ But the ‘chivalry’
[…] had been mown down and blown up in July, August, and September, and its remnants had
ﬁnished the year’s ‘crusade’ in a morass of torment and frustration.”27 Sassoon had reached
a decision on how he truly felt about the war, and his second war-time book, Counter-Attack
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and Other Poems, demonstrates his anti-war feelings superbly.
Unlike its predecessor, The Old Huntsman and Other Poems, Counter-Attack does
not have any poems unrelated to the war. While Old Huntsman opens with an eight-page
poem about pre-war days and fox hunting, and ﬁnishes with thirty-three lyrical,
pastoral poems to balance out the thirty-ﬁve poems on war, Counter-Attack opens with a
biting poem entitled “Prelude: The Troops.” 28 “Prelude” describes the passage of an army
Sassoon dubs “the un-returning army that was youth/the legions who have suffered and are
dust.”29
He follows this poem with a vivid description of battle in “Counter-Attack,” a piece
which tells of a unit having just taken a sector, now preparing for a German counterstrike.
The account of the subsequent battle is not the glorious description a newspaper would publish, but rather is full of uncomfortable war imagery. Finally, the poem ends with death and
the line “the counter-attack had failed.”30
The poems Sassoon places after “Counter-Attack” all use moving language. Many
of the poems leave the reader asking, ‘Why?’ Was this war or battle truly necessary? “The
Rear-Guard,” which follows “Counter-Attack,” has a man, tired from “days he’d had no
sleep,”31 who stumbles upon a body and asks it for help only to discover the person is dead.
Sassoon then moves swiftly into a poem that tells the story of any typical wiring party in
“Wirers,” but ends on a satirical note: “Young Hughes was badly hit; I heard him carried
away/Moaning at every lurch; no doubt he’ll die to-day/But we can say the front-line wire’s
been safely mended.”32 The ending seems to invoke a questioning of the war. Was this man’s
life worth mending the wires that protect the trenches? Will it make that much of a difference
in the end? Such inquiries lead Sassoon into literary attacks upon those who supported the
war, complacently or actively, such as journalists and generals, as well as women.
In “The Effect,” Sassoon uses a quote from a war correspondent as an epigraph upon
which to base his poem. The correspondent had observed, “the effect of our bombardment was
terriﬁc. One man told me he had never seen so many dead before.”33 Sassoon capitalizes on
the statement, “He’d never seen so many dead,” and uses it as the beginning lines of his ﬁrst
two stanzas, the effect of which is a satirical attack upon the journalists and the war. Sassoon
keeps up his attack on the press in the poems “Editorial Impressions” and “Fight to a Finish.”
In “Fight to a Finish,” Sassoon states that, when the war is won, the soldiers will take on the
press and the politicians behind the war: “I heard the Yellow-Pressmen grunt and squeal/And
with my trusty bombers turned and went/To clear those Junkers out of Parliament.”34
A few poems later, Sassoon shifts his point of attack from the journalists to the
generals. The poem, “The General,” is short but straight to the point, stating that the generals
running the show are “incompetent swine”:
GOOD-MORNING; good-morning!’ the General said
When we met him last week on our way to the line.
Now the soldiers he smiled at are most of ’em dead
And we’re cursing his staff for incompetent swine.
‘He’s a cheery old card,’ grunted Harry to Jack
As they slogged up to Arras with riﬂe and pack
But he did for them both by his plan of attack35
Sassoon ends the poem with a powerful statement, indicating that it is the general’s fault that
the men are all dead. He keeps with this line of reasoning in “Base Generals”; here, he says
that if he “were ﬁerce, and bald, and short of breath” he’d stay behind the lines of trenches
“and speed glum heroes up the line to death.”36
Next, Sassoon’s poetry assaults the parents supporting the conﬂict. In “The Fathers,”
Sassoon describes overhearing two old men discussing their sons’ performances in the war.
One father is proud of how his son is ﬁghting; the other is disappointed that his son is still
training and hasn’t yet been shipped off. The poem has a satirical air to it, as do many of the
poems in Counter-Attack.
Sassoon then switches to an attack upon the women backing the war in a very mov-
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ing poem titled, “Glory of Women.” In this poem, Sassoon accuses the women of encouraging the violence by worshipping heroes, by ﬁnding chivalry in a soldier’s attitude, and by
making shells for the troops. He also satirically notes how women perpetuate the idea that
British soldiers never “retire” and how utterly wrong they are in that belief.37
This poem shifts interestingly at the end, as many of his poems do, humanizing the enemy
soldier and thereby opposing the propaganda that was a large part of the war effort in World
War I: for example, the idea of the German Hun killing helpless Belgian babies was widespread. In “Glory of Women,” Sassoon shifts towards the last lines to focus on the German
mothers and soldiers: “O German mother dreaming by the ﬁre/While you are knitting socks to
send your son/His face is trodden deeper in the mud.”38 This idea of humanizing the enemy
is subtly mentioned in Memoirs of an Infantry Ofﬁcer. Here, Sassoon is fascinated with the
dead Germans and how human they are, even going so far as to examine one corpse.39 In
another passage, he describes a re-captured trench and the Germans’ corpses trampled into the
mud, an obvious precursor to the last line of “Glory of Women.”
Being complacent towards the war was a crime in Sassoon’s eyes. Perhaps his most
evocative piece in Counter-Attack directed at the complacent is “Suicide in the Trenches.”
“Suicide” tells what could be the story of any young British soldier who goes off to the war
and ﬁnds he cannot endure the consequent mental anguish. “Suicide in the Trenches” is very
straightforward in its language: the ﬁrst stanza tells the story of a happy soldier boy “who
grinned at life in empty joy”; the next stanza describes how, when he reaches the front, he
ﬁnds he cannot stand the conditions. The last six lines show the results:
He put a bullet through his brain.
No one spoke of him again.
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You smug-faced crowds with kindling eye
Who cheer when soldier lads march by,
Sneak home and pray you’ll never know
The hell where youth and laughter go.40
The last stanza is reserved for those who remain complacent with the war. By changing the
direction of the narrative from “he” to “you,” Sassoon successfully changes the entire feeling
and launches an attack upon the reader, in this case British citizens resting safely at home in
England and helping the war effort.
Sassoon’s anti-war poetry was not ﬁrst published as a book of collected works: he
wrote poems and sent them off to various magazines for publication. Cambridge Magazine,
an anti-war magazine, published many of his poems and introduced him into some paciﬁst
and conscientious objector circles.41 They were immensely inﬂuential to him, as was the overthrow of Czarist Russia, inspiring Sassoon to continue writing about the war.
In a bid to end the war, the new Bolshevik government in Russia had made public the
Allies’ secret treaties regarding the post-war division of German colonies. This led Sassoon
to believe the war was being carried out for economic gain and not for the liberation of France
or Belgium. Sassoon began to feel that his poetry was not enough, that he must do more for
his fellow soldiers who were dying in the trenches in France. Accordingly, Sassoon decided
to write his infamous “Soldier’s Proclamation.”42
This declaration was one of conscientious objection against the prolongation of the
war, how Sassoon had come to view the current ﬁghting. He sent a copy of his declaration to
his superior ofﬁcer, to Parliament, and to Robert Graves:
‘Finished With The War’
A Soldier’s Declaration
I am making this statement as an act of willful deﬁance of military authority, because I believe the war is being deliberately prolonged by those who have the
power to end it.
I am a soldier, convinced that I am acting on behalf of soldiers. I believe
that this war, upon which I entered as a war of defense and liberation, has now
become a war of aggression and conquest. I believe that the purposes for which I and

After Craiglockhart and the War
Sassoon departed from Craiglockhart and set about to return to the Western Front.
By returning to the front, he demonstrated the active passivity that James Campbell discusses
in his article: though having been sent to a military hospital for a mutinous statement about
the war, Sassoon willingly returned to the front.
By continuing to ﬁght in the war, he served the very arm-chair generals whom he
had attacked in his poetry. It was during this time period that many of the poems for his third
book, Picture Show, were written. His poems now move to a very despondent look on life.
They reﬂect the idea developed at Craiglockhart that no one can stop war. His poems take on
a bitter tone, and, while they do not support the war, there are not as many outright condemnations of war as there are in Counter-Attack. The title poem reﬂects this helpless feeling
towards the war, as the speaker is forced into a role of useless observance of men ﬁghting and
dying:
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my fellow-soldiers entered upon this war should have been so clearly stated as to
have made it impossible to change them, and that, had this been done, the objects
which actuated us would now be attainable by negotiation.
I have seen and endured the sufferings of the troops, and I can no longer be
a party to prolong these sufferings for ends which I believe to be evil and unjust.
I am not protesting against the conduct of the war, but against the political
errors and insincerities for which the ﬁghting men are being sacriﬁced.
On behalf of those who are suffering now I make this protest against the
deception which is being practiced on them; also I believe that I may help to destroy
the callous complacence with which the majority of those at home regard the
continuance of agonies which they do not share, and which they have not sufﬁcient
imagination to realize.
July, 1917.
S. Sassoon43
The military saw the letter as treasonous and so was forced to deal with Sassoon.
Not wanting to make a martyr of him by shooting him, (thanks to the maneuverings of Robert
Graves to get Sassoon put before a medical board) the military declared Sassoon was suffering from war-neuroses, or “shell-shock.” Sassoon was sent to Craiglockhart, a mental
hospital in Scotland, where he came under the care of Dr. W.H. Rivers, who was studying
shell-shock victims. As Sassoon recounted in Sherston’s Progress, he felt that Rivers knew
he wasn’t suffering from shell-shock, but they debated the validity of the war and so helped
Sassoon deal with his emotional frustration. Rivers also inﬂuenced Sassoon to write the
poem “Repression of War Experience,” the title of which was directly taken from one of Rivers’ lectures.44 Many of the poems in Counter-Attack were written during Sassoon’s stay at
Craiglockhart.
While staying at the hospital, Sassoon had some very important revelations concerning how he viewed the war. One example is that he had come to understand that true reality
for him was the war and not life behind the lines. Another is that he began to feel guilty about
his brother soldiers dying in the trenches while he remained in Scotland, playing golf and
writing verse with his new-found friend, Wilfred Owen. In Sherstons’s Progress, Sassoon
writes of dreams he had in which he sees the ghost of “Young Ormand” walking around the
hospital at night.45 Sassoon addresses these feelings in two powerful poems, “Sick Leave”
and “Banishment.”
“Sick Leave” describes the dead visiting him while he sleeps. They ask him why he
was not with them in the front line. He awakes and comments, “When are you going out to
them again/Are they not still your brothers through our blood?”46 He then moves on in “Banishment” to explain why it was that he wrote the “Soldier’s Proclamation” and why he will be
returning to the front line soon: “By grappling guns. Love drove me to rebel/Love drives me
back to grope with them through hell.”47

And still they come and go; and this is all I knowThat from the gloom I watch an endless picture-show,
Where wild or listless faces ﬂicker on their way,
With glad or grievous hearts I’ll never understand
Because Time spins so fast, and they’ve not time to stay
Beyond the moment’s gesture of a lifted hand.
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And still, between the shadow and the blinding ﬂame,
The brave despair of men ﬂings onward, ever the same
As in those doom-lit years that wait them, and have been…
And life is just the picture dancing on the screen.48
The Great War came to an end on November 11, 1918. The numbers of casualties
were staggering. Out of a total sixty-ﬁve million men mobilized on both sides, eight million died and another twenty-one million were wounded.49 The victims of the war are often
referred to as the lost generation, a title Barbara Tuchman gives a ﬁtting mathematical illustration in her book, The Guns of August. In it she notes that “the known dead per capita of population were one to twenty-eight for France, one to thirty-two for Germany, one to ﬁfty-seven
for England and one to one-hundred-seven for Russia.”50 Many families were dealing with
the loss of a loved one, and it was immediately after the war that Sassoon wrote the poem
“Reconciliation.”
“Reconciliation” deals with families mourning their losses. In the poem, Sassoon
once again compares the war to Golgotha, the place where Jesus was cruciﬁed, and which
translates into “Hill of Skulls.” Sassoon also reminds the suffering, allied mothers that, if
they go to the graves in France, they might ﬁnd “the mothers of the men who killed your son”
grieving as well. 51 Thus, he again brings to the forefront the humanity of the Germans. Even
the title, “Reconciliation,” hints at more than just coming to terms with the grief of loss. The
poem may very well be Sassoon’s attempt to urge his fellow country men not to be vengeful
towards the Germans. He urges the reader to remember “the German soldiers who were loyal
and brave.” Appropriately, while “Reconciliation” was being written, negotiations for the
Treaty of Versailles were taking place. The Treaty of Versailles would make Germany claim
responsibility for World War I as well as pay reparations to the allied countries.
Only about half of the poems in Picture Show continue in the fashion of Counter-Attack’s bitterness towards the war and Sassoon’s attempt to bring the truth of the war to public
awareness. Clearly, Sassoon was beginning to move away from writing solely on World War
I.
The ﬁnal poem, “Everyone Sang,” seems at ﬁrst glance not to be about the war.
Upon closer examination, however, it is about Sassoon’s war poetry and the war’s end. Stuart
Sillars discusses “Everyone Sang” in great detail in his book, Structure and Dissolution in
English Writing: 1910-1920. Stuart interprets “Everyone Sang” as Sassoon reacting almost
bitterly towards the end of the war. The poem starts out as a celebration that the war is over,
and the ending lines make the reader feel as though Sassoon’s role as anti-war literary leader
is over and done with: “O, but Everyone was a bird; and the song was wordless; the singing
will never be done.”52 Poetry is often referred to as “songs,” and, reevaluating the last line
in that context, Sassoon might very well have seen no more need for his poetry. The war
was over. As millions of soldiers return from the front—and millions more do not—the true
horror of the war was exposed without a doubt: the words of a soldier poet were no longer
needed because the true ramiﬁcations of the war were now evident to the citizens who had
stayed at home.53
Accordingly, the rest of the poems in Picture Show, while still displaying some of his
anti-war feelings, also portray his attempt to adapt to the coming literary times with non-war
themes. Poems such as “Butterﬂies,” “Idyll” and “Slumber Song” all discuss non-war ideals.
Sassoon produced many semi-autobiographical accounts of the war and of his life,
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most notably his Memoirs of a Fox Hunting Man. Sassoon also continued to write poetry.
Satirical Poems, The Hearts Journey, The Road to Ruin, Vigils and Rhymed Ruminations were
all written and published after the war. The majority of these books did contain a few antiwar poems. The inclusion of such poems in his later works suggests that Sassoon was still
against war to the same extent that he was during the war, especially since all of the poems
deal with the First World War with the special exception of The Road to Ruin.
The Road to Ruin appeared in 1933, a slim volume of eight poems condemning war
in general. 54 This was an important shift in how Sassoon viewed war. Previously, all of his
poems had attacked World War I only; The Road to Ruin was not about any particular war, but
about the general idea. In the title poem, “Road to Ruin,” Sassoon sends his hopes into the
future; however, none return. Finally, a ghost of his hopes returns to warn him, “No, not that
way; no, not that way.”55 Given the fact that in less than ten years the worst war the world had
ever seen would begin, this ﬁrst poem is a chilling foresight. The title poem is followed by
a quote from Albert Einstein that lays the charge that war is promoted by a “small but determined group” responsible for “manufacture and sale of arms” and encouraging war simply “to
advance their personal interests.”56
Following the Einstein quote are seven more strong anti-war poems. None of the
poems have the same descriptions of brutality as the war poems that Sassoon produced during
the Great War, but rather they argue that war in general is bad, not just because of what the
soldiers experience, but because of the total death, carnage, and brutal acts involved.
In the next poem, “At the Cenotaph,” Satan prays to God for war and encourages
men to ﬁght. Following this poem is “Mimic Warfare,” in which Sassoon happens upon a
mock battle by English troops while riding his horse in the countryside and is disheartened
to see them want to practice war. He also attacks the press again, writing, “No casualties
occur in such manoeuvres/(Blandly reported in to-morrow’s Times).” “A Premonition” and
“The Ultimate Atrocity” discuss the terrible inclusion of technology into war. “News from
the War-After-Next” discusses the rise of a military state and the death of idealism, as well as
another attack upon the role the Church seems to play in war: “The last Idealist was lynched
this morning/By the Beelzebub’s Cathedral congregation.”57 In the second to last poem, “An
Unveiling,” a speaker discusses how, in the past war, no one died in vain. Apparently nothing
was resolved either, however, because the government still decides to create a gas and bombproof shelter.
It is important to view these poems in relationship to the time. During the ten years
prior to 1933, while much of Europe worked on disarmament, Germany focused on rearmament. The Nazi party was on the rise in Germany and in 1933 Hitler became Chancellor.58
Mussolini rose to power in Italy and held hopes for a new Italian empire through military
conquest. Indeed, the last idealist that Sassoon spoke of may have been Giacomo Matteotti,
killed in 1924 for opposing Mussolini.59 These events drove Sassoon to remind the world of
the horrors of war through his poetry.
In 1945, Sassoon added an interesting poem to The Road to Ruin, “Litany of the
Lost.” In three stanzas, this poems attempts to summarize what Sassoon must have felt upon
the conclusion of World War II: “Deliver us from ourselves.”60 He describes his loss of faith
in human good and the realization of a world with atomic weapons. What is surprising about
Litany of the Lost” is that it is not a condemnation of war like so many of his other poems, but
a poem which paints a cynical picture of humanity.
Even more surprising are two poems he wrote at the very beginning of World War
II. They present a brief shift in his feelings toward war. “The English Spirit” and “Silent
Service” were both written during the Battle of Britain, during which England, and especially
London, were subject to continuous bombings from German planes. Both poems recognize
that war may be necessary at times.
“The English Spirit” tells the story of Apollyon (the devil) employing armaments
and bombing cities into oblivion. The end of the poem calls upon the strength of the English
people, saying the heroes of the English past have returned to stand with “us now in unimpassioned ranks/Till we have braved and broken overcast/The cultural crusade of Teutonic
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tanks.”61 This language is evocative of First World War propaganda, bringing to mind the medieval image of a German as a Teutonic knight, leading a charge of tanks against the British
people standing side by side with their dead heroes. “Silent Service” is even more outspoken
in support of the defense of England against Germany. Sassoon calls upon all of England to
defend Earth’s freedom: “None are exempt from service in this hour”62.
These two poems and “Litany of the Lost” pose an interesting dilemma in Sassoon’s
progression of anti-war ideology. Suddenly, two poems seemingly carry Sassoon’s literary
stamp of approval for the use of force while “Litany of the Lost” is more of a cynical view of
the future than a poem against war.
Together, the three poems force the conclusion that Sassoon was against war, but
understood that at times it was necessary. Sassoon watched the appeasement of Hitler fail and
realized the only thing left with which to meet ﬁre was ﬁre. Upon this realization, Sassoon
felt he had a duty to endorse this speciﬁc war against German aggression, and wrote two poems calling upon his fellow citizens to do what they must to defeat the enemy.
Thus, Sassoon had almost made a full circle. Entering the First World War full of the
belief in the liberation of Belgium, he quickly became disenchanted and disillusioned with the
motives of those waging the war and began to write against it, eventually refusing to serve for
the brief period that he spent at Craiglockhart hospital. He would never return to the “happy
warrior,” having already once experienced the reality of war. But, even during the midst of
the First World War he hinted at certain situations when war is necessary and just. In his
“Soldier’s Declaration,” he states that he entered the war because he saw it as a “war of defense and liberation.”63 Certainly, his declaration makes it clear that acts of aggression are not
“acceptable,” for he speaks out against “war of aggression and conquest.”64 After Germany
had taken over most of Europe and began to bomb Great Britain, Sassoon realized the extent
of German aggression and the necessity of liberation; Sassoon watched appeasement fail and
realized that victory through war was the only option left. Thus, he returned to the medium
that made him famous for protesting war, writing two poems encouraging his fellow citizens
to defend themselves. Ultimately, however, after the dropping of the atomic bomb and the
devastation of the Second World War, Sassoon exhibits a loss of hope towards humankind,
for, as he says in “Litany of the Lost,” “In breaking of belief in human good…save us from
ourselves.”
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Adam Philips’ interesting collection of unorthodox essays explores the narrative
rather than the curative potential of psychoanalysis, challenging Freud’s attempts to ally it
with science in order to give it greater validity in the eyes of his contemporaries as well as
his own. Philips asserts in his introduction that psychoanalysis in a purely scientiﬁc context
is stripped of its ﬂexibility and universality: the total merit of the practice is not in its quest
for the cure or for a normative life-story resulting from a successful progression of developmental stages, but in its discourse on what makes up a good life and the possibility of “many
kinds of good life” (4). Rather than conﬁning its use to that of absolute, diagnostic technique,
psychoanalysis is more advantageously employed as a discussion, “worth having only if it
makes our lives more interesting” (4). Thus, we can use it to enrich even (and especially) the
most overlooked, quotidian minutiae such as those suggested in the title. The author does not
dismiss the scientiﬁc aspect of psychoanalytic method, however, stressing the need for both
ways of talking and writing about psychoanalysis. He merely points out that, when examining life-stories, “a repertoire might be more useful than a conviction” (4).
True to his thesis, Philips’ essays are written in a wandering, Lacanian fashion,
reﬂecting the ﬂow of the unconscious rather than a logical, methodical progression of ideas.
He draws mostly from the schools of Winnicott and Klein in his examination of the “unexamined”—that is to say the most ordinary phenomena of development and everyday life largely
ignored by Freud. As does most of the book, the chapters discussed in this review center
around the Winnicottian “holding environment,” the developmental phase in which the child
ﬁrst recognizes himself as separate from the mother and begins to investigate his own dimensions and limitations. The main undertaking, then, is to explore the discussions we can have
about “normative” behavioral phenomena in the context of holding.
The third of eleven chapters, “On Risk and Solitude,” addresses the role of solitude
in determining what we value. Although a prevalent mode in infancy, solitude in itself is
not discussed in Freud’s works, elaborating instead on such abstracted solitary behaviors as
mourning, dreaming, and narcissism. Freud associates solitude with absence, a frightening
anticipatory state during which the child waits in the dark for his mother. In contrast, Philips
posits the fullness of solitude as the mode in which the child becomes aware of his desire, and
thus of his Self. Solitude, after all, is only experienced in relation to an object—the child can
only know of his aloneness after he has known company. The advent of solitude therefore
heralds the end of primary narcissism (the stage prior to any distinction between the Self and
that which is exterior to the Self) as the child comes to regard himself as separate from his
mother while still within her presence. Because a return to the narcissistic stage is impossible,
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the child is unable to regain the former physical and psychical connection with the mother and
so develops a desire for her that can never be fulﬁlled.
This creates ambivalence–although he wishes to be cared for, the child must entrust
himself to an Other beyond his control whose desires do not always refer to him–and resentment. The infant thus rages simultaneously for and against dependence; he must ﬁnd a way
both to accept his passivity and assert his freedom. This can only be done through risk, an experiment that provides knowledge both of the Self and of the objects independent of the Self
(and therefore dependable). Philips offers Winnicott’s discussion of risky adolescent behavior
as an example: as the teenager uses drugs or partakes in reckless sexual acts, he asserts his
independence from the body/sexuality that eludes his control. At the same time, he tests the
dependability of his body, engaging it in a sort of dialogue: “Is it a safe house? Is it reliable?
Does it have other allegiances?” (32). In this way, he creates a “holding environment” reminiscent of the one he experienced in infancy. Forming an idea of and conﬁdence in the object
enables him to accept her freedom at the same time he accepts her passivity: “His capacity for
a beneﬁcent solitude will depend on his being able to entrust himself to his body as a sufﬁciently holding environment” (32). The patient of psychoanalysis also engages in risk through
free association—he entrusts himself to the unpredictability of what he will say next in order
to test the expectations and responses of the analyst. A good analyst, like a mother who gives
her child space, will allow her patient to create a holding environment in which to explore his
thoughts and independently advance his analysis. Therefore, within an environment of his
own creation, the analysand does the therapy work in relation to the analyst.
Insofar as the “good life” is concerned, risk permits us to gauge what we value. It is
crucial to a healthy, social existence to have concern for others, but it is even more crucial to
personal development to suspend this concern in risk. This is so because objects demand concern; in risk we focus on our own desire and suspend concern for the Other, testing both the
objectivity of and our relation to the Other. It is only when we feel guilt for this suspension
and our reparations are accepted that we acknowledge the Other’s subjectivity. Allow me to
compare this to a child’s attempt to build a tower out of blocks: seeing his mother’s delight at
his accomplishment, the child knocks over the blocks, suspending his concern for her desire.
He then feels guilt and apologizes. If all goes well, she promptly forgives him after showing
some disappointment. Through this experiment, the boy learns of his mother’s dependability
as a loving entity. More importantly, he learns of her desire and therefore of her subjectivity. Here, Philips observes that “two solitudes are created,” afﬁrming the connection between
solitude, desire, and subjectivity.
Also, the mother’s survival of the child’s efforts to nullify her sets her apart as
something beyond his control–what Winnicott calls the “benign circle” (suspension of concern, rapacious desire, destruction, guilt, and reparation) is a form of risk that establishes the
constancy of the object to which the risker entrusts himself (36). The lesson of the chapter is
ultimately that we can gain self-knowledge only in relation to the Other, exploring what Lacanian psychoanalysis would designate as the entrance into the Symbolic realm of desire almost
exclusively through the terminology and ideas of Winnicott and Klein.
The ﬁfth essay, “Worrying and Its Discontents,” examines a different aspect of the
holding environment. Philips looks at how children use worries to combat their ambivalence
toward their mothers, and thus their ambivalence toward dependence. Guided in part by the
Oxford English Dictionary, the essay ﬂows along the progression of several etymological
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inquiries (a technique often used by Freud), mimicking the interpretive component of free
association and making it the most loosely organized piece in the book. The author begins
the section by relating the comment of a ten-year-old male patient: in response to the question
“What are worries?” the boy replies, “Farts that don’t work” and consents that some worries merit keeping (47). Philips promptly picks apart this description of worries, exposing its
implications—what is the “work” that worries are not doing? What characteristics do “farts
that don’t work” and worries share in common? He concludes the two could be described as
obstructions of experience, the exchange of which could cause displeasure in others: “for this
boy, then, worrying could be a form of emotional constipation, an unproductive mental process that got him nowhere; and this was part of its value to him” (48). This “getting nowhere”
is exactly the static result of ambivalence: the boy both placates his mother with worries for
her to solve, earning solitude for himself, and evokes her desire, drawing her to him by way of
a sort of oedipal mechanism. As in “On Risk and Solitude,” the subject experiments with his
relation to the Other, at the same time “ﬁlling in” and appealing to the Other’s lack.
Worries in themselves also have a dual aspect. To illustrate this, Philips resorts to the
Oxford English Dictionary to trace the evolution of the meaning of “to worry.” In its earliest usage, “worry” was a hunting term synonymous to strangulation. It then came to mean
“to devour,” and then “to agitate.” Philips notes that, sometime in the nineteenth century, “to
worry” became a reﬂexive action as well as something one does to another person or thing.
Thus, we can direct worries at others or use them on ourselves, evoking the possibility of both
master and victim relations to our worries. Returning to the etymology of the word, Philips
poses the question, what are we trying to devour in others and in ourselves by worrying?
To explore this function of worrying, he compares worries to dreams, immediately
noting that there is no “worry work”—that is to say, worries do not mask their meaning: “all
of us may be surrealists in our dreams, but in our worries we are incorrigibly bourgeois” (55).
Indeed, worries are very speciﬁc, so much so that they oversimplify the problem addressed—
the worrier as object of his worries oversimpliﬁes or suppresses himself, while the worrier
who projects outward suppresses the Other. This suppressive function is underlined by the
fact that, while dreams allow introspection, the worry does not call its objects into question;
whereas the dream looks back, the worry always anticipates the future. Ultimately precluding external interference and self-appraisal, the worry “regulates intimacy” in an effort of
self-preservation (58). Philips compares this to Winnicott’s concept of “False Self,” a relation
constructed in self-defense by the infant towards an invasive mother. In other words, when
the infant does not feel the mother allows him enough space in which to develop a holding environment, he presents her with a “False Self” to provide freedom for his True Self. Worries,
then, are a way to stabilize our psychic environment, keeping others at a comfortable distance
as well as “domesticat[ing] self doubt” (58). Although this enables us to maintain our focus
regarding certain activities, it is a means of obscuring perceived reality, as do dreams. In
a concluding comparison between dreams and worries, Philips states that both phenomena
attempt to defy interpretation but neither is completely successful. Ultimately, both provide
often profound amounts of insight regarding the desires and anxieties of the subject.
The seventh chapter, “On Being Bored,” adds an unexpected dimension to the holding environment/ambivalent attitude toward mothering. Unsurprisingly, boredom does not appear to be an intriguing enough topic for psychoanalytic examination. In its defense, Philips
explains the Freudian and Kleinian psychoanalytic omission of this less spectacular phenom-
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ena: “as psychoanalysis has brought to our attention the passionate intensity of the child’s
internal world, it has tended to equate signiﬁcance with intensity and so has rarely found a
place, in theory, for all those less vehement, vaguer, often more subtle feelings and moods that
much of our lives consist of” (68). Conversely, Winnicott’s work was the ﬁrst to investigate
the more “quiescent” states of childhood, and thus is the most organic to Philips’ thesis and
the most appropriate to his discussion of boredom.
Far from being a lack of “something to do,” Philips posits boredom as a mood or attitude in which one waits not on something external but on one’s Self. He describes boredom
as a kind of “free-ﬂoating attention,” an objectless gaze, a lull in active immersion in one’s
surroundings (69). As illuminated above, this boredom employs the two projects children
have in relation to their parents—those of self-sufﬁciency and dependence. These projects
are codependent and require the nurturing but laissez-faire holding environment that develops
in the space between child and parent in order to be carried out properly. The child realizes
that he wants the increasingly preoccupied mother in unison with his need for escape from
her—the breast, for example, is simultaniously nourishing and oppressive. But in order to
ﬁnd some other object, he must ﬁrst turn inward and “ﬁnd himself as the source of possibilities”; he must ask himself what he desires. This ambivalence-inspired occupation of the Self
occurs in the holding environment, the maintenance of which is crucial. The mother who recognizes the necessity of allowing boredom becomes a living embodiment of this environment;
she serves as a “transformational object, “the “object” (though the infant does not perceive her
as such) in relation to which the child makes the transformation into desiring subject. Unfortunately and to the child’s detriment, the seemingly unproductive state of boredom is not
well-received with parents and is often discouraged; “it is one of the most oppressive demands
of adults that the child should be interested, rather than take time to ﬁnd what interests him”
(70). If a child feels he is “not allowed to be bored” (a quote from one of Philips’ patients), he
will compulsively seek out desire by throwing himself into activity and lose his capacity for
boredom. This frantic outward display of interest is another manifestation of the False Self
discussed in “Worrying and Its Discontents.”
While the bored Self has more potential than the falsiﬁed Self, the former is to all
appearances empty. Philips compares it to Freud’s deﬁnitions of mourning and melancholia
(in the latter’s essay of the same name), describing boredom as both an impoverishment of
the external world (mourning) and of the ego (melancholia) (74). The resulting lull acts as
a space for interest gradually to arise in preparation for something unknown. Because the
object of desire has not yet presented itself, boredom cannot properly be called “waiting” nor
can it be called an expectant state. Thus boredom protects the individual from anxiety by not
disclosing the fact that he was waiting until he has found the object of his desire.
Here, children have an advantage over adults, as waiting takes precedence in adulthood and the disinterested attitude of boredom gives way to a restless, committed anticipation
of elusive objects. Adults tend to insist on and invest too much in their desire, neglecting the
two opposed advantages of being bored, “the lure of a possible object of desire, and the lure
of the escape from desire, of its meaninglessness” (76). Boredom, then, is a variant of waiting
that is free of neuroses.
Adam Philips’ collection of essays does not easily lend itself to summary or description. Concisely stating the contents of the arguments is a bit like making a story out of dream
segments as Philips meanders from one point to the next, proposes new avenues that are
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never pursued, and injects quotes sans preface by people from Bob Dylan to William Blake.
On Kissing, Tickling, and Being Bored is provocative and pleasurable to read, yielding new
insights at each reading. What is truly remarkable about the book (and the thesis) is Philips’
ability to take a single psychoanalytic phenomenon and elicit several separate and intriguing
narratives from it. In addition to the chapters discussed above, he explores the holding environment and ambivalence in the contexts of tickling, composure, the maternal relationship of
analyst to analysand, the role of obstacles, and kissing. One may wonder what other discussions would be possible using the paternal aspect of Lacanian psychoanalysis along with the
mother/infant theories of Winnicott and Klein, but, insofar as it goes, the overall achievement
of the work is its stunning testimony to the plasticity of psychoanalysis in its narrative ability
to make life more interesting, and thus more “good.”
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In the book For the Sake of Simple Folk: Popular Propaganda for the German
Reformation, R. W. Scribner studies visual propaganda and its role in the dissemination of
the evangelical movement during the ﬁrst half-century of Reformation Germany. Scribner
posits that although much has been written on the spread and use of visual propaganda in the
Reformation, it has been the subject of no thorough systematic investigation. He writes that
historians in the past have had a blind spot when it came to images and that more interest has
been devoted to pamphlets in the assumption that their content reﬂects the views of those for
whom they were intended. Scribner believes that the conjecture that people of any social class
in that age gained their knowledge primarily through the printed word is false. Scribner’s hope
is that, through a study of visual propaganda, we may gain a wider knowledge of how the
Reformation appealed to common folk than is possible by concentrating on the printed word
alone. Scribner’s research strategy throughout this book attempts to “penetrate the visual message of broadsheets by unraveling the language they spoke as a speciﬁcally hybrid (oral, print
and visual) form of communication” (xv). Scribner’s research approach includes methods of
iconography, iconology and semiology and focuses attention on the propagandist broadsheets
and the slim pamphlets or chapbooks of Germany. His primary sources include images found
in print rooms and ﬁne art museums.
Scribner divides his book into nine chapters. In chapter one, he begins his discourse
by establishing the visual nature of Reformation Germany. He writes that few were truly
able to read and that literacy was concentrated mostly in towns and in the southwest portion
of the country. No more than 5% of the population could read, and most people would have
had to have broadsheets read to them (3). In fact, some broadsheets and pamphlets actually
instructed their readers to pass the message on to those who could not read (6). Scribner goes
on to emphasize the visual nature of the culture by citing the increase in mystics and popular
devotions such as the veneration of the Veronica cloth and the use of woodcut pictures of
saints in prayer. One printed book would be sold to approximately 20,000 readers, but in just
one day just as many woodcut tokens of images of saints for pilgrimages would be sold (4).
Because of the visually oriented nature of the masses, the effectiveness of the visual message
in propaganda needed to be as strong as the written word.
The ﬁrst point Scribner deals with is images of Luther. Scribner divides these images
into three categories. The ﬁrst category features Luther portrayed as a saint. Early images of
Luther place him within the framework of divine history by using symbols or stories from the
traditional church. As a saint, Luther’s break from the Church is legitimized as he is given
authority from a source above and beyond the Church. These images also imply that those
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opposed to the source of Luther’s inspiration are also opposed to God. The second category of
Luther portraits are of Luther as the teacher of true doctrine, opponent of false belief, and exposer of the un-Christian nature of the Church. The third category depicts Luther as a national
or humanist hero. One example Scribner shows is of “Luther as the German Hercules.” Here
the propagandists draw from classical myth, appealing mainly to humanists. Propaganda in
this category was circulated little and did not continue as the movement progressed – probably, as Scribner suggests, because the subject matter was not easily identiﬁable to the common
man.
What Scribner shows in the next chapter is that the next step in the propaganda process leads the viewer from one line of argument to another by chain association. The title of
this chapter is “Enemies of the Gospel” and shows how Reformation propaganda contrasted
the un-Christian practices of the Church with those of the true followers of the Word. Scribner shows how a pre-Reformation tradition of anti-clericalism and anti-monasticism from
the late 1500’s is continued and strengthened through association with Luther’s doctrine. In
some cases, images from pre-Reformation criticism of monastic drunkenness, gluttony and
sexual vice were directly incorporated into Reformation propaganda. Reformation propaganda
furthers this notion by illustrating that monks are not only un-Christian but also enemies
of Christ. They then equate the Church with the anti-Christ. To prove their point, they use
biblical criteria. They show that monks are anti-Christian because they reject the Bible. To
illustrate their point, they reshape biblical situations that the people were sure to recognize—
parables such as ‘the Good Shepherd’ or metaphors such as ‘darkness and light’ in order to
convey the messages. To gain support, Reformation propaganda against monasteries also
drew on socio-economic grievances of the time. Many broadsheets equate monkish vice with
economic exploitation, particularly appealing to the poor. Many of the broadsheets are binary
in composition—a long-held tradition in the church of illustrating opposing images, such as
depictions of Heaven and Hell. The Reformers, however, contrasted the “Church’s Forgiveness,” indulgences which the poor could not afford, with “True Forgiveness,” where any man
could confess of his own will.
In chapter four, Scribner addresses the use of popular culture in Reformation propaganda. Scribner shows how propagandists appealed directly to the hearts of the simple man
through illustrations that incorporated common social customs and cultural symbols of the
lower strata. For example, many propagandist images were of play. Scribner writes that the
function of play was to reduce the high and serious to the level of the comic and mundane.
This kind of criticism robbed the exalted members of the Church of their aura of sanctity,
showing them as common men. Here, Scribner focuses most of his attention on the idea of the
Carnival, the most popular and universally attended form of play in the Middle Ages. During
Carnival there was a suspension of norms. The lower classes parodied the ofﬁcials including
monks and priests, in mock dramas of ofﬁcial ofﬁces. Scribner writes that it was only natural
to turn these images from realistic to propagandist. In several images reproduced in the book,
the Pope is shown as a carnival puppet: because a puppet deceives only the young or foolish,
this implied that the Pope was deceiving the masses with his false teachings. It also showed
that the Pope’s beliefs were of straw and rags (puppet material), while Luther’s were of the
true God. Another way of reducing a person in the Renaissance was through a letter of strong
resentment called a Schandbild, which heaped abuses on an enemy. These usually were sent
to one’s enemy and included an illustration of the person being hung. Hanging was reserved
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only for the lowest classes, so this was a great insult. In the Reformation, Luther himself made
such images for the Pope and Cardinals. Scribner also writes about the use of the “material
bodily principle” in Reformation propaganda. Many images of church ofﬁcials show them
heaped in dung or in some way producing bodily wastes. The intent was to lower the standing these people had in the minds of the masses and to show that they were no different from
anyone else. In this chapter, Scribner effectively describes how the propagandists effectively
drew from easily identiﬁable codes and cultural phenomenon of the time to draw attention to
their cause.
Chapter ﬁve examines how popular belief and its symbols were drawn upon to
spread the Reformation message and especially how the popular devotional imagery was
reshaped to this end. One of the most inﬂuential communal devotions was the procession that
occurred during feast days, fairs, or in times of distress to call upon God’s intervention. Processions were very visual and included banners, displays of the sacraments and the hierarchy
of the church. In broadsheets, these invocations of the saints became carnivalesque parodies
of the excesses and abuses of the Church as they participated in various immoral acts. Reformation propaganda also incorporated many common superstitious beliefs. The Reformation
came about in an age of great interest in the Apocalypse due to prophesies proclaiming the
end of the world and an increase in astronomical research. Misbirths, deformities and visions all pointed to the end of the world and to alliance with the devil, so much so that people
looked for these signs in the world around them. Reformist propaganda preyed upon this
fatalistic view and incorporated these signs into their works (for example, they might show
the Pope as a monstrous being). Lutheran astronomers prophesied the downfall of the Church
and the rise of a new faith built on the Word, while visionaries in the style of Hildegard of
Bingim saw Luther enthroned in heaven. All these popular beliefs, Scribner shows, were illustrated in ways the public could understand.
In chapter six Scribner shows how apocalyptic Reformation propaganda developed
fully with the Pope emerging as the Anti-Christ in a world turned upside down. Scribner
writes that by the end of the ﬁfteenth century, the Anti-Christ was a common ﬁgure in works
of popular writers and even had his own biography. The use of the Anti-Christ in protest of the
church was not new. Franciscan Spiritualist and Joachimite movements had used the ﬁgure in
opposition to the Church in the past. Since Lutheran propaganda had already established that
the Pope stood in opposition to the Word, it was an easy step to identifying the Pope with the
Anti-Christ. Most commonly, the propaganda would present the corruption of the Pope and
his Church in opposition to the life of Christ. For example, one image might depict Jesus ﬂeeing the Jews who attempt to crown him king, while another image nearby shows the Pope defending his position with cannons and swords. In other depictions, the Pope takes on the form
of the three-headed dragon from apocalyptic literature. These scenes show the Apocalypse in
full swing in present-day Germany with recognizable people and places. These illustrations
of the Last Days, Scribner writes, were perhaps the most moving and inﬂuential of all the Lutheran propaganda because they hit home with an audience already obsessed with the Apocalypse. They conﬁrmed that the Last Days were at hand and that the Anti-Christ was in fact
the cause of it, giving the public a ﬁgure to combat. This lent their argument legitimacy and
credence because it was conﬁrmed by scripture, contemporary events and prophesy, which the
Lutherans ﬁt into the apocalyptic story. The most important strength of this theme was that the
Pope could be seen as the Anti-Christ in both person (as a beast) and in actions (in contrast to
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In chapter seven, Scribner looks at Reformation propaganda from the end of the
Reformation period that not only characterized the two kinds of belief but also portrayed two
separate institutions. Scribner shows how this was established through examples of images of
the Lutheran sacraments. Depictions of Baptism, especially infant Baptism, distinguished Lutheranism from Anabaptist belief, while a stress on the real presence in Communion separated
it from Zwinglian belief. Many later pieces also sought to establish a kind of apostolic succession among the founders of the movement. For example, one image portrays Wycliff kindling
a spark in a tinderbox, from which Hus takes a light. From Hus’s ﬂame Luther lights a torch
that is passed to Melanchthon. Often these ﬁgures were put into biblical stories as witnesses
or participants. Scribner sees this as a way in which the new church attempted to create its
own hagiography and further legitimize its cause.
In chapter eight Scribner ends his discourse by taking a quick look at the surprisingly miniscule amount of counter-propaganda from the side of the orthodoxy, comparing
its content with that of the Lutheran propaganda. Scribner ﬁnds Catholic propaganda less
effective than Lutheran propaganda for several reasons: to begin with, Catholic propaganda
relied heavily on text in a mostly illiterate society; secondly, the ideas used were the stock
images of often unimaginative, earlier agendas (frequently, counter-propaganda themes were
taken directly from Lutheran propaganda); and ﬁnally, Orthodox propaganda seldom included
references to social or class issues, popular or cultural phenomenon, or popular belief. In essence, Catholic propaganda failed because it lacked the qualities that drew the common man
to Lutheran propaganda. According to Scribner, Lutheran propaganda was highly successful
in appealing to the masses because it exploited the heritage of the past, used traditional images from popular culture and popular belief, echoed the grievances of common opinion, built
upon superstitious beliefs and moods, and built for the future by instructing the masses on the
foundations of belief.
Scribner’s argument is very convincing. To begin with, Scribner effectively asserts the importance of the inquiry into the visual aspects of Reformation propaganda. After
reading about the illiteracy rate and the use of visual elements in daily and spiritual life, it is
easy to see how propaganda needed to give equal weight to the image as to the word. Other
reviews, as well as the preface of the book (which is in its second edition), indicate that this is
the ﬁrst detailed analysis of the visual aspects of Reformation propaganda. Therefore, Scribner does not dispute any author in particular. He simply maintains that imagery is of equal or
more importance to the success of the transmission of ideas during the Reformation.
Although it is hard to measure the success Reformation propaganda had in persuading common folk to support the movement (and Scribner does not profess to try to do this), it
is easy to see that the propagandists used many symbols and cultural elements directly aimed
at the commoner. Scribner effectively outlines the iconographical tradition in place and the
incorporation of commonly known symbols into the propaganda. He coherently analyzes
almost two hundred illustrations of broadsheets and chapbooks for elements of cultural life
to back up his argument (all of which are reproduced in the book for the reader likewise to
dissect). Scribner’s knowledge of common life and customs within the German territories as
well as the attitudes of its people is staggering, and he provides a great deal of information on
this subject alone. Scribner’s organization of the book makes it easy for the reader to follow
the progression of his argument as he builds his case from the beginning (when propagandists
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used traditional symbols) to the apex of development (when propagandists incorporated their
own set of codes and stereotypes from cultural and popular traditions to both gain support and
instruct, thus unifying their cause). Scribner’s abundance of example work against him, however. For each of the two-hundred illustrations, Scribner goes on to use methods of iconography, iconology and semiology to decipher their intentions, often going into so much detail that
the reader loses either interest or the thread of the argument. On the other hand, the number of
illustrations is an asset to the book since it stands as a notable collection of reformation propaganda and can be used for reference. In conclusion, For the Sake of Simple Folk: Popular
Propaganda for the German Reformation, while an excellent resource for anyone seriously interested in visual propaganda and its role in the dissemination of the evangelical movements,
is not a light read and will not appeal to those without a strong interest in the subject matter.
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The Reformation had a profound and everlasting impact on German society. Many
historians perceive that the Reformation was a failure and that Martin Luther’s failings led to
the rise of the totalitarian state and the demise of the German culture. Social historian Steven
Ozment has a more compassionate view of Luther’s desires for Reformation in his book
Protestants: The Birth of a Revolution. Ozment views Luther’s desires for Reformantion not
as a political or social revolution but as a revolution of the individual. The focus of Ozment’s
book is sixteenth century Germany and what it meant to be a Protestant. Ozment presents the
argument that the Reformation started with the theologians’ sermonizing and pamphleteering
the messages that then entered into law and public institutions and ﬁnally into the lives of the
ordinary citizen. Ozment’s citation of several primary sources and direct challenges to other
historians clearly demonstrates Ozment’s belief that Luther’s work within the Reformation
was a positive achievement for German society.
The study of the pamphlet allows us to understand how the Protestant message was
heard by the layperson because the pamphleteers brought theology into the marketplace with
their preaching. The pamphleteers wrote on several religious subjects, such as the abuse of
the Catholic Church, teaching on doctrine, and how to respond to these changes in everyday
life. Ozment explores the works of converted Franciscan friar Heinrich von Kettenbach. One
of Kettenbach’s pamphlets, entitled Contrasts Between Anti-Catholic Behavior of the Pope
and the Biblical Ministry of Jesus, exposes the Pope’s unbiblical behavior. Fictional stories
such as Eberlin von Gunzburg’s pamphlet entitled The Lamentations of Seven Pious but Discontent Priests Who No One Could Comfort pretends to be a transcript of seven priests who
have a private discussion of the burdens of the priesthood.
The pamphlets raised the common person’s awareness of the abuse of the church and
gave laymen spiritual self-conﬁdence and a sense of equality with the clergy. Ozment states
that the pamphleteers tried to “demonstrate the human origins of much church teaching and
thereby to inoculate in the laity a healthy skepticism and deﬁance to tradition” (57). The pamphlets had a major impact on German society for the spread of Protestantism. The printing
press allowed these publications to be more widespread. However, Ozment states that without
the printing press, the Reformation still would have occurred because Germany was an oral
society, relying on spoken word and not print. The preaching and teaching of the average
person assisted them in their understanding of the validity of the Catholic Church’s practices.
In response to the transformation of the convert’s lives, the pamphlet’s content was
transformed as well. The pamphlet went from calling for change to serving as a guide of
how to conduct oneself in daily life. Ozment gives the example of pamphleteer Heinrich
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von Kettenbach’s experience of acting as a spiritual advisor for an older woman. Kettenbach
urged this woman to stop buying church candles and give her life savings to the poor and her
relatives. He also addressed her decision to invest her life savings in an anniversary mass in
her memory after she died. He challenged her decision and told her that she had a responsibility to her relatives by providing an inheritance and that she was robbing the poor with her
lack of discretion. These ideas of religious change had a direct impact on this woman’s life.
A life-long habit of doing what she thought was religiously necessary was now sinful in the
light of her social responsibilities. The reformers found themselves addressing issues such as
the validity of last wills and testaments and contracts, as well as the legitimacy of secular and
religious taxes. All of these issues were practical and the new convert was instructed in how
he or she should act.
The private religious transformation of an individual was a change within the person.
However, for the Reformation to have a major impact on society as a whole, the teachings had
to become lawful. The princes and magistrates were targets for reform just as much as the
average person. Ozment addresses the belief that the German magistrates and princes politically manipulated the Reformation to their own advantage. Ozment believes that “it was the
evangelical preachers and their congregations who forced upon magistrates and princes new
religious order” (103). Ozment implies that the rulers would have faced division within their
lands, so they had little choice but to concede to the will of the people. The Reformation was
thus a reaction of the common man rather than the decision of the governing.
Luther’s Reformation inﬂuenced the change of individuals and institutions but many
scholars contend that the young Luther contradicts the old Luther. Ozment speciﬁcally challenges Peter Blichle’s claim that Luther “assisted in the suppression of the political principles
that he had earlier championed” (121). Ozment argues that the two-kingdom doctrine of
Luther was consistent from its inception until Luther’s death. The two kingdoms consisted of
the temporal and spiritual authorities that were to be separate and distinct, yet rule together.
The temporal was responsible for all that pertained to the life of the body. The spiritual was
responsible for all that pertained to the soul. In Luther’s Open Letters to the Christian Nobility of a German Nation, he asked the nobility to reform the churches themselves. As time
went on, Luther saw the abuses of the nobility and addressed their behavior with the treatise
On Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should be Obeyed, in which Luther makes distinctions between spiritual and temporal government and the limitations placed on the temporal.
The two-kingdom doctrine was only obtainable with social order. Without ruling and obeying, the advancement of society could not occur. Luther expected rulers to administer secular
justice with biblical standards. In the case that a ruler was a tyrant, Luther would say that
it was better to live under the rule of a tyrant while gradually appealing to them in order to
prevent chaos and mob rule.
In response to accusations that Luther’s political moves led to the totalitarian state,
Ozment afﬁrms that “in Luther’s time, democracy as we have come to know it today was
entangles with utopianism. If Germans had embraced ‘democracy’ as it was envisioned by
the leaders of communal theocratic movements, it would likely have done Germany far more
harm than three centuries of autocratic rule by princes” (133). The consolidation of political
power by German princes started in the mid-fourteenth century and extended into modern
times. The townsperson of the time had been familiar with the changing political environment; what was new was the adaptation to a new religious life.
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In order for the Protestant beliefs to be engrained into society, the development of
catechism was initiated. The catechism provided a foundation for German youth and instilled
in them the understanding of a godly purpose for their lives regardless of actions, while at the
same time making them feel shame for immorality and the fear of its consequences. Contrary
to current scholarship, Ozment claims that the catechism did not force conformity and bigotry
but was a lesson of good conduct and citizenship. The teaching of the catechism was more
the application of the bible to daily life than the teaching of doctrine. The catechism replaced
the pamphlet by establishing guidance for all society in practical spiritual applications.
Ozment admits it is a challenge to get an accurate portrayal of what is was like to be
an ordinary person during the Reformation. He states that historians often base their theories
on generalizations by looking at public records as well as traditional rituals and festivals. Ozment uses autobiographies and letters to establish a more accurate portrayal of how Protestantism affected individual lives.
Ozment’s summary of two autobiographies describes individual experiences of two
men’s responses to Protestant propaganda. The ﬁrst of Ozment’s subjects is Thomas Platter,
a convert to Protestantism. Ozment describes his struggles of being accepted by his Catholic
family and his decision not to pursue the priesthood. The second subject, Herman Weinsburg,
was a lifelong Catholic; his views about the church and clergy were changed because of the
Reformation and Counter-Reformation.
Ozment also conducts a study of letters exchanged by young men with their families
to give insight into the experiences of youths coming of age and the development of their
beliefs in regard to religion and life. Each young man had different experiences and used
their knowledge of faith and doctrine to help them make daily and lifelong decisions. Ozment
characterizes the personal experiences under different subject headings that demonstrated piety and provincial understanding, anti-Catholic controversial subjects, self-serving rhetorical
Lutheranism, and Lutheran teaching of the forgiveness of sin. The four young men Ozment
analyzes belonged to the Behaims, an important Nuremberg family. Of the three that lived to
adulthood, one became a politician, another village magistrate, and the third a merchant who
owned his own business.
Ozment’s study of the autobiographies and letters allows us to see how individual
lives were inﬂuenced by Protestant ideas. What Ozment fails to demonstrate, however, is how
the Reformation affected the lives of the common person. I would suspect that the common
person did not write an autobiography. The four boys obviously came from an inﬂuential
family. Ozment’s focus on autobiographies and letters, rather than public records, fails to
provide an accurate example of the common Protestant in the sixteenth century.
Much must be considered when attempting to grasp the achievements and effectiveness of the Reformation on German society. Martin Luther and the reformers did not set out
to make major social and political changes with the implementation of reformist propaganda.
Because of the impact of Protestant ideas and doctrine on German society, many social and
political changes did occur. In response to these changes, Luther and the reformers served as
guides for societal responsibility in support of the two-kingdom doctrine. Ozment describes
Luther as a brilliant reformer who transformed German lives and provided the spiritual
foundation for social and political cohesion necessary for Germany to succeed as a people.
According to Ozment, if any blame should be placed for the failings of Germany, it should be
placed on the German people for not following the teachings of Martin Luther.

In Brief
Foer, Jonathan Safran. Everything is Illuminated. New York: Perennial, 2003. 288pp.
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Jonathan Safran Foer’s novel, Everything is Illuminated, is the story of Jonathan Safran Foer, a young American Jew who journeys across Eastern Europe,
seeking the woman who may have saved his grandfather from the Nazis. He
is accompanied by his translator, Alex, a young Ukranian who is “ﬂuid” in
English; his grandfather, an old man who deals with the loss of his wife and
his memories of war by pretending he’s blind; and Sammy Davis Junior,
Junior, the hyperactive “seeing-eye” dog. While Alex recounts their adventure in his delightfully decimated English, Jonathan imagines the history of his grandfather’s village, hoping his
fantastic tale can ﬁll in the gaps in his family’s past. One Hundred Years of Solitude meets A
Confederacy of Dunces.
~ Allison Barrett
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Horowitz, David. Uncivil Wars: The Controversy
of Reparations for Slavery. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002. 147pp.

in brief

The purpose of this book by David Horowitz is twofold. On the one hand it
tells the story of Horowitz’s personal experiences following his decision to
participate in the public debate over whether or not black Americans should
be paid reparations for slavery. On the other hand it is a work written to
address the extent to which the American academic community is dominated by a liberal left
that is intolerant of outside viewpoints.
Horowitz reaches the latter purpose through his account of the former. After placing
an ad in several college newspapers in which he outlined his reasons for being against reparations, a ﬁrestorm of controversy ensued. Horowitz then uses his experiences (and the experiences of others that sided with him) to reveal the extent to which the liberal left dominates
American universities and to show furthermore how intolerant many of those within the liberal left are of outside viewpoints. The sharp reaction to his work and the fact that few people
anywhere in the academic world came out in defense of his right to free speech (no matter
how much they might have disliked what he was saying) surely proves this.
Horowitz writes an entertaining, thoughtful account of his experiences and draws
some troubling conclusions from them. Everyone who has contact with the academic world
should understand the threat that any single opinion dominating our educational institutions
represents. The book is interesting reading not only for those interested in race issues but also
for anyone involved in the academic world.
~ Matt Feltner

Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone draws attention to the dwindling sense of
communal responsibility in America. Convincingly drawing on data over
the past century, Putnam outlines how membership in organizations and
even recreational interaction has plummeted starting in the 1960s. Departing from traditional explanations, Putnam links this decline not to the
changing family structure or work schedule, but more decidedly to the exchange of physical
capital for social capital in the younger generation. Putnam outlines the severe penalties this
lack of involvement has on the American population, including decreased security, a slackening economy and even deterioration of physiological health. He concludes by urging his
readers to begin a new era of innovation and involvement modeled on American activism at
the start of the Twentieth Century.
~ Teresa Moore
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Putnam, Robert D. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000. 544pp.

in brief

After September 11, it became clear that religious conviction can intensify to the point of extreme violence. There are certain factors within all
religious traditions that inevitably lead to evil and violence: blind obedience, claims about absolute truth, the conviction that the ends justify the
means, the establishment of an ideal time, and the declaration of a “Holy
War.” At the same time, Charles Kimball, an ordained minister and professor at Wake Forest
University, explains that religion can be life afﬁrming and has brought meaning to the lives of
thousands of people. While his argument focuses on Christianity and Islam, the world’s two
largest religions, other religious traditions are discussed. The book is made all the more vivid
and accessible through Kimball’s use of detail from his experience as a director of interfaith
programs and a facilitator in the Iranian crisis.
~ Amanda Knapp
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The Death of Vishnu is the ﬁrst novel written by Manil Suri. Suri begins
his intended trilogy with a novel concerning the social and political fabrics
of contemporary India, told through the eyes of approachable characters.
Varying relationships exist throughout the novel, testing traditional Indian
values along the way. For example, dueling households, one Hindu and one
Muslim, argue over petty kitchen issues while their daughter and son sneak off with the
intention of eloping. Their elopement not only addresses the religious altercations prevalent
on the subcontinent but also confronts the tradition of arranged marriages. The title character, Vishnu, has been the servant of both households in this Bombay apartment building but
is now dying. The question becomes who is responsible for this man, and, more symbolically, who is responsible for the mistreatment of the poor in India. Suri names his most
prominent character after the Hindu god and preserver of the world; now it is time for his
community to take responsibility for the “man” who is to preserve them. Addressing many
contemporary issues of Indian society, Suri has written an interesting and accessible novel
for the Westerner. By including believable characters with realistic problems, Suri appeals
to a wide audience with themes of love, responsibility and community.
~ Lauren Suveges
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Zizek, Slavoj. Welcome to the Desert of the
Real. New York: Verso, 2004. 96pp.

in brief

Part of a series by Verso of current philosophical perspectives on the events
and aftermath of September 11, Slavoj Zizek’s Welcome to the Desert of the
Real! is a characteristic combination of Marxist and Psychoanalytic thought,
illuminated by examples from current events and popular culture. This work
of ﬁve essays takes the position that America’s capitalist ideology seems to
present us with two clear and seemingly opposite choices after 9/11—either
we side with Democracy, the American Dream, and the War on Terror, or we
take up with evil Muslim fundamentalism. Zizek sets out to explain why this is yet another
example of an ideology’s displacement of its own inadequacies onto an “obscene Other,”
an external element, such as a Jew, a Muslim, or a freed slave, that upsets the balance and
harmony of an otherwise perfect state. According to his argument, the ultimate realization we
need to make is that there is no choice, only its illusion: in choosing the democratic, American ideology, we also choose the negative backlash that is its consequence. As Zizek states,
“Jihad and McWorld are the two sides of the same coin, Jihad is already McJihad” (146).
Although the reading of this book may prove difﬁcult without some familiarity with Marxist
and/or Psychoanalytic vocabulary, Welcome to the Desert of the Real! is both informative and
pleasurable to read as well as a good approach to Zizek’s larger body of work.
~ Ashar Foley
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